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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: AN AMERICAN
SOLUTION TO THE MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE GROUP CONUNDRUM
Robert W. Miller*
The first step to dealing with a problem is admitting its exis-
tence. Commentators have overcome this initial barrier for adminis-
tering insolvent multinational enterprise groups, and many have
chronicled the problems in great detail. Yet, most commentators have
either settled on the current solutions or created broad theoretical
frameworks. Commentators agree that any test should consider a
group's of integration. Moreover, a finding of economic integration
could sway a foreign proceeding to provide the comity necessary for a
consolidated proceeding. Defining integration, however, has proven
difficult.
Finding a solution need not entail turning away from American
bankruptcy law. The framework used in In Re General Growth
Properties provides an excellent foundation for analyzing whether a
multinational enterprise group is sufficiently integrated to conduct a
consolidated proceeding.1 The efficacy of the framework is not acci-
dental as the problems raised by solvent subsidiaries pulled into bank-
ruptcy are very similar to the problems of consolidated multinational
enterprise group proceedings. In both cases, creditors will often op-
pose consolidating some members and the court must decide the pro-
priety of consolidating the group. The Economic Integration Test
serves the same function as the analysis in General Growth. Namely,
it ensures that a consolidated multinational enterprise group proceed-
ing is beneficial for both the individual members and the group, is fea-
sible, and is done in good faith. Courts should apply the Economic
Integration Test to consolidated multinational enterprise groups pro-
ceedings in the United States under either the current version of the
Bankruptcy Code or an amendment to the Model Law.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable William L. Stocks, United States Bankruptcy
Judge for the Middle District of North Carolina; J.D. with Honors, Emory Univer-
sity School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Peter Hay for helping me for-
mulate this topic. I would also like to thank Judge Stocks for giving me the
opportunity to improve my knowledge of bankruptcy law as his law clerk. Lastly, I
would like to thank Susan Miller and Alexandra Dugan for their love and support.1 See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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INTRODUCTION
In today's globalized economy, Multinational Enterprise
Groups ("MEGs") are extremely prevalent. The finances and opera-
tions of group members are often integrated to minimize costs and in-
crease productivity. The success of an individual group member may
be contingent upon the success of the group. Once bankruptcy pro-
ceedings commence against members of the MEG in different States,
however, adjudicators do not treat the group as an economically inte-
grated unit, and only members in the same State may consolidate
bankruptcy proceedings. 2 As a result, group-wide solutions, such as
cross-border sales or restructurings, are restricted and both the poten-
tial continued operations of the MEG and the potential returns for
creditors are limited.
Many academics have considered, commented, and critiqued
how international bankruptcy treats MEGs. Most scholars agree that
consolidating proceedings in one court reduces costs and increases re-
coveries, especially in reorganizations. 3 Both the United Nations
Committee on International Trade Law's Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency (the "Model Law")4 and the European Union's Regulation
on Insolvency (the "EC Regulation")5 (when addressed together the
"Insolvency Regimes") hinder consolidation, by requiring separate
treatment of each debtor, including separate Center of Main Interest
2 Paul H. Zumbro, Cross-Border Insolvencies and International Protocols-An Im-
perfect But Effective Tool, 11 Bus. L. INT'L 157, 162 (2010).
3 See, e.g., Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bank-
ruptcy: How Territorialism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43, 84
(2009); Samual L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls are Coming: A Reply to Professor
LoPucki, 79 Am. BANKR. L.J. 105, 117-18 (2005); Susan P. Johnston & John Han, A
Proposal for Party-Determined COMI in Cross-Border Insolvencies of Multina-
tional Corporate Groups, 16 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 811 (2007).
4 Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30,
1998) [hereinafter Model Law]. The U.N. promulgated the Model Law on May 30,
1997. Legislation based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law has been enacted in Aus-
tralia (2008), the British Virgin Islands (2003), Canada (2009), Colombia (2006),
Eritrea (1998), Great Britain (2006), Japan (2000), Mauritius (2009), Mexico
(2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand (2006), Poland (2003), the Republic of
Korea (2006), Romania (2003), Serbia (2004), Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000),
United States (2005), and Greece (2010). Status, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.
org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Modelstatus.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2012).
5 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EC Regula-
tion]. The EC Regulation applies to all European Union members except Denmark
and the United Kingdom.
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
("COMI") analyses.6 Instead of consolidating all of the group mem-
bers7 in one jurisdiction applying its substantive bankruptcy law, each
COMI administers its members separately.' The resulting duplicative
bankruptcy cases waste resources and limit potential group-wide solu-
tions. What test courts should use to decide where the consolidation
should occur (the "COMI of the Group") remains unsettled. Yet, the
emergence of at least two reasonable proposals, illustrates the feasibil-
ity of creating a framework. 9
A number of academics have noted the necessity of consolidat-
ing some corporate groups on the basis of "economic integration."1 °
The importance of economic integration stems from the efficacy of
group-based solutions for interdependent MEGs. Cases like In re
HiHI' and In re Avianca"2 illustrate the potential for consolidated
MEG proceedings. Comity remains a necessity for a consolidated
MEG proceeding, however, because the COMI of the Group does not
control the assets of foreign members. A finding of economic integra-
tion by the COMI of the Group could be vital to securing comity. Irit
Mevorach, one of the foremost scholars of MEG bankruptcies, has out-
lined many useful considerations of whether to consolidate an MEG's
bankruptcy case and what type of consolidation should occur. 13 No
scholar has yet suggested a framework for testing economic integra-
tion in the United States.
Although changes to international bankruptcy law may facili-
tate consolidation of MEG cases, the United States is already equipped
to consolidate MEG proceedings. Filing bankruptcy in the United
6 Miguel Virgos & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings, at 51-52 (May 3, 1996), 1996 O.J. (L 6500/96).
7 This article refers to the entities comprising an MEG as members rather than
parents and subsidiaries as it more accurately describes the term enterprise
group, compared to corporate group. See Irit Mevorach, Towards a Consensus on
the Treatment of Multinational Enterprise Groups in Insolvency, 18 CARDOZO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 359, 361-62 (2010) [hereinafter Towards a Consensus].
8 Universal Proceduralism, as profiled later, provides an alternative consolidation
framework with the consolidated proceeding applying the substantive law of the
situs of the assets. See infra Part I(A). However, this article assumes that lex con-
cursus is the future for consolidated MEG proceedings.
9 See infra Part II(c)(v)(A).
10 See, e.g., Adams & Fincke, supra note 3, at 84; Mevorach, Towards a Consensus,
supra note 7, at 364.
11 McGrath v. Riddell (In re HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd.), [20081 UKHL 21, [2]
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffman) [hereinafter McGrath].
12 In re Aerovias Nacioales de Columbia S.A. Avianca, 303 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003).
13 See IRIT MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE GROUPS
153-59 (2009) [hereinafter INSOLVENCY WITHIN]; Mevorach, Towards a Consensus,
supra note 7, at 364.
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States is relatively easy because all related cases, foreign and domes-
tic, may be filed in one bankruptcy court. 4 An amendment to the
Model Law may facilitate consolidated MEG proceedings in the future.
Additionally, economic integration is also compatible with Universal
Proceduralism-another promising theory. 15
After deciding the COMI of the Group, the analysis should con-
sider the economic integration of the MEG. Then, if the group is eco-
nomically integrated, the proceedings should analyze whether
procedural consolidation or substantive consolidation applies. The Ec-
onomic Integration Test (the "Test") based upon In re General Growth
Properties," a recent chapter eleven bankruptcy case, should function
as a blueprint to test economic integration in the United States under
section 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the "Code")' 7 or a future
amendment to the Model Law. The Test seeks to ensure four things:
(1) consolidation is in the best interests of each member to be consoli-
dated, (2) consolidation is not objectively futile, (3) each member who
will be consolidated has a bankruptcy purpose, and (4) a group-wide
solution is practical. The Test's different parts embody these four
goals through an analysis of each foreign member. The first part of the
Test, known as the Interests of the Group, is a fact-specific inquiry
into whether both the member's and the group's interests would be
served by consolidating the member's bankruptcy with other group
members.' s The second part of the Test, the Good Faith Analysis, con-
siders the objective futility of the member's bankruptcy and whether
the member's filing has a bankruptcy purpose.1 9 If a member fails ei-
ther the Interests of the Group or the Good Faith Analysis, the mem-
ber's case is dismissed. Once the Interests of the Group and the Good
Faith Analysis are complete for each member, the court applies the
cumulative analysis to consider whether the members of the MEG who
passed, plus any domestic members, would be sufficient to create a
group-wide solution. If the members who own the most valuable as-
sets are dismissed because they failed either prong, a group-wide solu-
tion could be impossible and the foreign members' cases would be
dismissed.
14 1 ALAN N. RESNICK ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 13.14[l] (16th ed. 2011).
15 Edward J. Janger, Reciprocal Comity, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 441 (2011) [hereinafter
Reciprocal Comity]; Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 819 (2011) [hereinafter Universal Proceduralism]; Edward J. Janger, Vir-
tual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 401 (2010) [hereinafter Virtual
Territoriality].16 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 62-65.
17 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006). All sections in this article refer to the Code unless
otherwise stated.18 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 61.
19 Id. at 65.
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Part I summarizes international bankruptcy, the Insolvency
Regimes, and the numerous problems posed by MEGs. Part II consid-
ers the current solutions to the problems of MEGs. Part III discusses
commentators' proposed solutions. Part IV profiles the potential
COMI of the Group analyses. Part V considers the importance of de-
ciding the type of consolidation, compares a potential amendment to
the Model Law with the current potential for consolidated MEG pro-
ceedings in the United States, and illustrates why MEGs would want
to file for bankruptcy in the United States. Part VI is an analysis of
the Economic Integration Test. It considers both the Test origins and,
through an analogy to Yukos Oil, Test application.
I. INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY AND TREATMENT OF
MEGS
First, Part I outlines the theoretical underpinnings of bank-
ruptcy while focusing on the international aspects. Second, it de-
scribes how the bankruptcy regimes based on the Insolvency Regimes
function. Third, it profiles the difficulties that insolvent MEGs pose.
A. Theoretical Underpinnings
The primary goal of bankruptcy is to solve the common pool
problem and maximize the returns of a debtor's creditors. A debtor
has a single pool of assets to satisfy all creditors. In the vast majority
of cases, the pool is not large enough to satisfy all relevant debts.
Without bankruptcy, creditors would "race to collect" on their debts at
the first scent of a debtor's financial trouble.2 ° The "race to collect" is
not only costly but some creditors will receive nothing while similarly
situated creditors receive full compensation.2 1 Bankruptcy reduces
the costs of the "race" and the variances in recovery amongst similarly
situated creditors.2 2 To best effectuate liquidation, reorganization, or
even discharge, all jurisdictions where a debtor has debts must recog-
nize the proceeding. In the United States, "the Framers' primary goal
was to prevent competing sovereigns' interference with the debtor's
20 Collection is a simplification. Unsecured creditors usually must get a judgment
from the court on a debt, then secure the judgment against the debtor's property
through a lien and finally record the secured lien. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 33-54 (3d ed. 1996).
21 Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Credi-
tors' Bargain, 91 YALE L. J. 857, 861 (1982); see also Elizabeth Warren, Bank-
ruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REv. 336, 350 (1993)
(describing the perverse incentives for creditors to not work with a debtor because
those who collect first without engaging the debtor receive better returns).
22 Jackson, supra note 21, at 862; Warren, supra note 21, at 350.
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discharge." 23 Hence, bankruptcy is federal law and a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding has preclusive effect throughout the nation.2 4 Universalists,
who support one worldwide procedural and substantive bankruptcy re-
gime, champion this view internationally.2 5 In a Universalist system,
one proceeding is opened in the debtor's domicile ("Main Proceeding"),
all the debtor's assets are pooled, and then administered using lex con-
cursus-the Main Proceeding's substantive and procedural law.26
Furthermore, the Main Proceeding's rulings will have preclusive effect
worldwide, as other jurisdictions must honor any relief that the Main
Proceeding grants. 27 Universalism's greatest draw is efficiency. Mul-
tiple proceedings based on position of the debtor's assets compounds
transaction costs, while linguistic, cultural, and legal verities hinder
the debtor's administration and coordination between proceedings.2 8
The efficacy of bankruptcy is largely dependent upon a "court's
ability to control and marshal assets."2 9 Territorialism represents this
view as each country administers a debtor's assets and operations
within its jurisdiction using its own substantive and procedural laws
in an effort towards worldwide consistency.3 0 A Territorialist system
governed international bankruptcy prior to the enactment of the Insol-
vency Regimes and its best attribute is predictability. 1 Territorialism
does not require the sometimes difficult task of deciding a debtor's
23 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006).
24 See id. at 366-68 (stating that framers created the bankruptcy clause so that a
bankruptcy discharge would have preclusive effect throughout the United States).
25 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [6]; see, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global So-
lution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276 (2000) [hereinafter A
Global Solution]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global In-
solvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L. J. 457 (1991)
[hereinafter Theory and Pragmatism]; Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Uni-
versalism in Cross Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 787
(2000).
26 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [20]; Jonathan M. Weiss, Tax Claims in Transna-
tional Insolvencies: A "Revenue Rule Approach", 30 VA. TAX REV. 261, 269 (2010).
As opposed to the lex situs, the laws of the States where the debtor's assets are
located. See Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 15.
27 Rosalin Mason, Cross-Border Insolvency Law: Where Private International Law
and Insolvency Meet, in INTERNAL INSOLVENCY LAW: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 27,
45-48 (Paul J. Omar ed., 2010).
28 Bufford, Global Venue, supra note 3, at 111.
29 Underwood v. Hilliard (In re Rimsat, Ltd.), 98 F.3d 956, 961-62 (7th Cir. 1996).
30 Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 160 (2005).
31 Territorialism still reigns in some countries including Israel. See In re Gold &
Honey Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 369 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009) (paraphrasing the Israeli
Court, who denied the effect of the automatic stay in Israel because "a United
States court cannot control the actions of a foreign court, nor can it exercise control
over assets in a foreign country..."); see generally Samuel L. Bufford et al., Inter-
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"home country."3 2 It also limits potential forum shopping because
moving the situs of assets is more difficult than changing a debtor's
domicile.33 Lastly, local creditors receive the treatment they expect
when local substantive bankruptcy law, including statutory priorities
of payment, is applied to local assets. Therefore, unlike Universalism,
Territorialism does not require "acceptance of outcome differences,"
which occur when local assets are administered under non-local bank-
ruptcy law to the detriment of local creditors.3 4
Universal Proceduralism purports to combine the best attrib-
utes of Universalism and Territorialism by applying the procedural
law of the debtor's domicile and the substantive law of the situs of the
debtor's assets.35 This new theory suggests harmonizing international
choice of law principles to coordinate administration of the debtor us-
ing the procedural law of the debtor's domicile.3 6 The substantive law
of the situs of the assets, however, would determine issues such as the
validity of contract or property rights and the statutory priority of
claims-a process known as Virtual Territoriality.3 7 Advocates sug-
gest that the pressure of designating the debtor's domicile, an issue
this article visits in greater detail in Part I(C)(i), would be mitigated
because the rewards for choosing a particular forum erode if the sub-
stantive law of the situs governs the assets. 38 Moreover, applying the
procedural law of the debtor's domicile preserves the benefits of consol-
idated administration and coordination the debtor's bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.3 9 Critics counter that the line between procedure and
substance has always been elusive40 and the pressure on deciding the
national Insolvency, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2001), available at http://www.fjc.
gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookupfIntlInso.pdf/$file/Intllnso.pdf.
32 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000) [hereinafter Cooperative Territoriality].
33 LYNN M. LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 210 (2005) (listing alleged examples of fo-
rum shopping in international bankruptcy). The COMI of a debtor is presumed to
be at its registered seat. See Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 16(3).
34 Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 25, at 458; see also McGrath,
[20081 UKHL at [24-25] (noting the greater the outcome differences the more diffi-
cult it is to allow a foreign jurisdiction to apply its law to your assets).
35 See, e.g., Janger, Reciprocal Comity, supra note 15; Janger, Universal
Proceduralism, supra note 15; Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 15.




40 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Comment on Universal Proceduralism, 48 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 509-12 (2010).
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debtor's domicile will simply be shifted to litigating the location of the
debtor's assets.4 1
B. Insolvency Regimes
The current impossibility of Universalism led to the Insolvency
Regimes being based upon Modified Universalism, a compromise be-
tween Territorialism and Universalism.4'2 A world-wide treaty is nec-
essary to implement Universalism but many states are unwilling to
surrender all Territorialist protections." The Insolvency Regimes cir-
cumvent the "territorialism vs. universalism" debate by focusing the
bulk of their provisions on procedural matters.4 4 Chapter 15 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code ("chapter 15")4 5 is derived from the
Model Law,4 6 basing the vast majority of its sections upon Model Law
provisions. 47 The Model Law influenced the EC Regulation, which
represents a Modified Universalist view.4" Unlike chapter 15, it is not
derived from the Model Law.4 9 Closer ties between European Union
members50 allow stronger Universalist measures that the Model Law
cannot accommodate.,5
Recognition of a proceeding under the Model Law is a three
step process with three potential conclusions: (1) the debtor files for
41 Id. at 513. Westbrook suggests that instead of forum shopping, "forum stash-
ing" will occur as debtors transfer readily moveable assets to bankruptcy havens
whose law will govern under Universal Proceduralism. Id.
42 Westbrook, A Global Solution, supra note 25, at 2301.
43 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 563, 570-71 (1996) (discussing the inability of even the United States
and Canada to adopt a Universalist treaty between the two nations).
44 John A.E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bank-
ruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 961 (2005) [hereinafter Procedural].
45 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-32 (2006) (Chapter 15 uses the Model Law as a template
with some modifications).
46 Id. § 1501(a) ("The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with
cases of cross-border insolvency.").
47 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 718-
19 (2005) [hereinafter Chapter 15 at Last]. But see Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, Over-
view of Chapter 15 Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J.
269, 269 (2008) (outlining the differences between the Model Law and Chapter 15
as well as their impact).
48 See Bufford, Global Venue, supra note 3, at 118.
49 See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 47, at 273.
50 See EC Regulation, supra note 5, at T 2 ("The proper functioning of the internal
market requires that cross-border insolvency proceedings should operate effi-
ciently and effectively...") (emphasis added).
51 See O'Sullivan v. Loy (In re Loy), 432 B.R. 551, 560 n.12 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating
that the EC Regulation does not provide for a Non-Main Proceeding).
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bankruptcy in State A where a proceeding is commenced, (2) then a
representative of State A applies for recognition of State A's proceed-
ing in a proceeding in State B,5 2 and (3) State B's proceeding may rec-
ognize State A's proceeding as: (1) the COMI of the debtor and the site
of the Main Proceeding,5 3 (2) not the COMI but a Non-Main Proceed-
ing, 4 or (3) A Non-Recognized Proceeding.5 5 The Main Proceeding is
held at the COMI of the debtor, which applies its substantive and pro-
cedural bankruptcy law.5 6 Among the Main Proceeding's powers, it
may issue a worldwide stay halting all proceedings and collection ac-
tions against the debtor.5" The Main Proceeding may also request
turnover of the debtor's assets worldwide for administration under the
substantive law of the COMI.5 s
Non-Main Proceedings, or Secondary Proceedings, 9 may be
held in any jurisdiction where the debtor has an establishment. An"establishment" means "any place of operations where the debtor car-
ries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and
goods or services."6 0 Parties open Non-Main Proceedings to protect lo-
cal businesses and creditors.6 1 A Non-Main Proceeding may decline to
turn over local assets to a Main Proceeding if the interests of domestic
creditors would be inadequately protected.6 2 This territorialist ele-
52 See Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 15.
53 See id. art. 17(2)(a); In re Ernst & Young, 383 B.R. 773, 780 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2008) (recognizing an earlier Canadian proceeding as a Main Proceeding by bank-
ruptcy court).
54 See Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 17(2)(b).
55 See In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2008) (granting summary judgment for neither foreign Main nor Non-Main pro-
ceeding for a Cayman Islands liquidation).
56 See Model Law, supra note 4, at arts. 15-24.
57 See id. art. 20(1).
58 See id. art. 21(2).
59 See John A.E. Pottow, A New Role For Secondary Proceedings in International
Bankruptcy, 46 TEx. INT'L L.J. 579, 581-83 (2011) (explaining traditional notions of
Non-Main Proceedings) [hereinafter A New Role].
60 See Model Law, supra note at 4, at art. 2(f). 11 U.S.C. § 1502(2) (2006) uses
slightly different language ("'establishment' means any place of operations where
the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity").
61 See Fogerty v. Condor Guaranty, Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 329
(5th Cir. 2010) (Higginbotham, J.) ("Providing access to domestic federal courts to
proceedings ancillary to foreign Main Proceedings springs from distinct impulses
of providing protection to domestic business and its creditors as they develop for-
eign markets.").
62 See Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 21(2).
20121
194 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:2
ment allows a Non-Main Proceeding to protect local creditors by apply-
ing local substantive bankruptcy law to local assets.6 3
Neither the Model Law nor chapter 15 explicitly assists Non-
Recognized Proceedings, also known as Tertiary Proceedings. 4 A
Non-Recognized Proceeding occurs when a debtor's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is held in a country where the debtor does not have an estab-
lishment.6 5  An ironclad chain linking the requirement for
establishment with recognition and relief means that a Non-Recog-
nized Proceeding receives no direct aid from either a Main or Non-
Main Proceeding.6 6 Thus, without recognition, a Non-Recognized Pro-
ceeding cannot take advantage of any relief that the Model Law pro-
vides." Part II(C)(v) will discuss the effect of Non-Recognized
Proceedings on administering MEGs.
C. Issues Caused by MEGs
The ability to administer MEGs through international bank-
ruptcy remains limited even as they multiply. This section summa-
rizes the problems inherent in administering insolvent MEGs. First, it
considers the uncertainty caused by potential consolidation that may
vest as an increased cost of capital for individual MEG members, eas-
ier forum shopping, and heavier pressure on judges. Second, it exam-
ines how state sovereignty over individual entities and the protection
of local creditors, together a concept known as "Pride,"6 hinder inter-
national comity. Third, it outlines how corporate separateness and
state sovereignty spawn multiple proceedings and duplicative costs.
63 In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 82
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) ("U.S. creditors are not precluded from filing an involun-
tary plenary proceeding against the debtor in the United States if there is a show-
ing of a need for additional protection."); see Pottow, Procedural, supra note 44, at
961.
64 See Samuel L. Bufford, Tertiary and Other Excluded Foreign Proceedings
Under Bankruptcy Code Chapter 15, 83 Am. BANK. L. J. 165, 166 (2009) (coining
the term tertiary proceeding) [hereinafter Tertiary]. See generally Ranney-Mari-
nelli, supra note 47, at 299-305 (discussing the difficulties Non-Recognized Pro-
ceedings have in obtaining judicial relief in the United States).
65 Bufford, Tertiary, supra note 64, at 166.
66 See In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. at 81
n.42.
67 See Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 21(1) (discussing the forms ofjudicial relief
that are available only upon recognition of a foreign proceeding).
68 Professor John A.E. Pottow coined the term "Pride" for protection of local credi-
tors and state sovereignty in international insolvency. John A.E. Pottow, Greed
and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to
"Local Interests", 104 MicH. L. REV. 1899, 1919 (2006) [hereinafter Greed and
Pride].
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Fourth, it inspects the problem of more developed nations' probable
hegemony over consolidated MEG proceedings. Fifth, it analyzes the
problems that Non-Recognized Proceedings pose for the Model Law in
general, and chapter 15 in particular.
(i) Uncertainty
Consolidating MEGs' bankruptcy proceedings may create un-
certainty about the applicable bankruptcy law of group members. A
popular suggested solution for administering MEGs is to consolidate
all the group members in one State, which then applies its substantive
bankruptcy law to all the consolidated entities.69 A system of consoli-
dation based upon anything less than Universalism, however, will
breed uncertainty.7 ° States may refuse to grant assistance to a Main
Proceeding for the MEG or creditors may be unable to ascertain where
a MEG will be consolidated. 71 Such uncertainty will impact the credit-
worthiness of MEG members because creditors must consider which
substantive bankruptcy law will apply to potential claims.72 Because
States differ in their treatment of creditors, potential creditors will
hedge their risk by structuring financing to protect their interests
under all potential States' bankruptcy regimes. The increased protec-
tion required by potential creditors will manifest as increased lender
and supplier requirements and a higher cost of capital for MEG mem-
bers. 73 Although the Insolvency Regimes already create some uncer-
tainty about the individual corporation's COMI, 74 a potentially
different COMI of the Group would further muddle creditors' expecta-
69 See infra Part II(b).
70 See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 30, at 143.
71 Id.
72 See Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 385. Unless an ironclad
rule develops regarding consolidation, an element of uncertainty will be added. An
ironclad rule of automatic recognition could potentially cause only a one-time
change in the creditworthiness of entities. Such a rule has been suggested, but its
current potential is limited. See id. at 408. But see Bufford, Global Venue, supra
note 3, at 138 (consolidating will not significantly impact the cost of capital be-
cause creditors will know they are dealing with a company that could be procedur-
ally consolidated).
73 See generally John C. Coffee & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The
Problem of Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U.
CR1. L. REV. 1207, 1224 (1991) (discussing impact of uncertainty on an enterprise's
cost of capital).
74 See, e.g., Alexandra C.C. Ragan, COMI Strikes a Discordant Note: Why U.S.
Courts are not in Complete Harmony Despite Chapter 15 Directives, 27 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 117, 120 (2010).
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tions about what substantive law would apply to a future
bankruptcy.
MEG Consolidation could increase uncertainty by spurring in-
vidious forum shopping and forcing judges to make difficult fact-based
decisions. 76 A debtor's ability to manipulate its COMI in bad faith is a
subject of much debate.7 7 Because a debtor's COMI is presumed to be
located at its registered office, 7" a debtor can thwart creditors by regis-
tering in a "bankruptcy haven" just prior to filing for bankruptcy.7 9
Consolidation proponents assert, however, that it is much harder to
manipulate the COMI of an entire MEG compared to an individual
memberS°-a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Uncertainty also manifests as a further strain on the judiciary
whose ability to cope is disputed."1 Deciding a COMI of the Group
could be a difficult and technical task for a judge, which at least one
commentator describes as "highly subjective." 2 Samuel L. Bufford in-
stead argues that the process is objective.8 3 Bufford, a former bank-
ruptcy judge, 4 cites the many guides and commentaries available to
aid judges and the protection that the appellate process's objective
standards provide.8 5
75 See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 30, at 143.
76 See id.
77 Compare LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 32, at 2230-31 (sug-
gesting the ease of forum shopping), with John A.E. Pottow, The Myth (and Reali-
ties) of Forum Shopping in Transnational Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 785,
786 (2007) (arguing that forum shopping has not been a significant problem) [here-
inafter The Myth].
78 See 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2006); Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 16(3). The regis-
tered office is analogous to the principal place of business under U.S. law. See In re
Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 634-35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006). The
United States Supreme Court case further illuminated the standard as the "nerve
center" or the location from which the corporation is directed. See Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193-94 (2010).
79 LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 32, at 2230-31.
80 Bufford, A Global Venue, supra note 3, at 137 (citing Andrew T. Guzman, Inter-
national Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MIcH. L. REV. 2177, 2214
(2000)).
81 See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 30, at 143.
82 See id. at 153-54.
83 Bufford, Global Venue, supra note 3, at 118. Judge Bufford was a bankruptcy
judge in the Central District of California. He is currently the distinguished
scholar in residence at Penn State University's Dickenson School of Law.
84 Id. at 105.
85 See id. at 119.
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(ii) Pride
Pride exacerbates the problems of administering MEGs. The
first element of Pride is the States' (and their proceeding's) desire to
uphold their sovereignty by regulating domestic corporations, includ-
ing their corporation's bankruptcy proceedings. The United States Su-
preme Court observed that, "every person who deals with a foreign
corporation impliedly subjects himself to such laws of the foreign gov-
ernment, affecting the powers and obligations of the corporation with
which he voluntarily contracts, as the known and established policy of
that government authorizes." 6 A proceeding, therefore, would try to
control all the debtor's assets over which it can plausibly claim juris-
diction.8 7 Hence, the assets of an individual MEG member will be ad-
ministered at either the location of the individual member's COMI, or
the situs of the assets, but not the COMI of the Group.88 The second
element of Pride is the protection of local creditors who expect local
bankruptcy law to govern their claims. Many States treat secured and
general unsecured creditors in similar ways, but statutory priority
rules vary significantly.8 9 Although some priorities are based on effi-
ciency,90 many represent State specific policy judgments that chosen
classes of creditors should receive better treatment than general un-
secured creditors. 91 A change in forum for a group member may im-
pact the substantive rights of local creditors by applying different
statutory priority rules for payment of claims.92 Recent scholarship
discussed in greater depth in Part III (D) illustrates that Pride acutely
affects United States Bankruptcy Courts.
86 Canada S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1883).
87 Pottow, Greed and Myth, supra note 65, at 1915. In contrast, a lesser held view
of State sovereignty would also consider the level of state interest in a MEG. For
instance, Italy had a much stronger interest in the restructuring or liquidation of
members of the Parmalat group than other countries. See Matteo M. Winkler,
From Whipped Cream to Multibillion Euro Financial Collapse: The European Reg-
ulation on Transnational Insolvency in Action, 26 BERK. J. INT'L L. 352, 369 (2008)
[hereinafter From Whipped Cream].
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Breaking Away: Local Priorities and Global
Assets, 46 TEx. INT'L L.J. 601, 602 (2011).
90 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2006) (providing for administrative expense pri-
ority for attorney fees. Bankruptcy attorneys would be unwilling to work on cases
if they received only a pro-rata return like general unsecured creditors).
91 See, e.g., Emilie Beavers, Note, Bankruptcy Law Harmonization in the NAFTA
Countries: The Case of the United State and Mexico, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV.
965, 985-88 (2003) (discussing the drastic differences between Mexican and United
States statutory priorities for taxes and employee wage claims).
92 Pottow, From Greed to Pride, supra note 68, at 1906.
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(iii) Parallel Proceedings
If a MEG's corporate separateness and Pride are respected, a
different Main Proceeding will occur in at least every group member's
COMI. A Main Proceeding will occur at the COMI of each member; a
Non-Main Proceeding may occur everywhere else the group members
have establishments. When Main and Non-Main Proceedings occur si-
multaneously, they are known as parallel proceedings.
Unfortunately, parallel proceedings hinder potential group-
wide solutions, such as reorganizations9 3 or packaged sales,9 4 because
substantive bankruptcy rules often conflict and greater cross-border
coordination is required.95 When parallel proceedings are opened,
group member's assets may be sold piecemeal in jurisdictions around
the world.9 6 Such disjointed sales under different substantive bank-
ruptcy regimes limit both a party's ability to purchase all of a MEG's
assets and also to continue operating a MEG as an integrated going
concern.9 7 The loss of value from individual sales is particularly acute
when the debtor is worth more as an integrated group than as sepa-
rate entities." Moreover, like the removal of a wall from a house of
cards, additional, unnecessary liquidations could be triggered when
members' reorganizations are contingent upon already-liquidated
members. The ability of a debtor's management to continue running
the debtor's business during bankruptcy proceedings also varies.
Some States usually allow management to continue in place while
others require its removal.9 9 Without overarching administration, re-
organizing on a group basis becomes difficult. Parallel proceedings re-
quire additional foreign judges and governmental representatives who
slow proceedings, as decision-making is more disparate. 10 0 The often
complex factual and legal scenarios bearing on multiple group mem-
93 See Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 420.
94 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 153-59.
95 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 393.
96 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 167.
97 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise
Groups in Insolvency, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working
Group V (Insolvency Law), 38th Sess., T 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.92/Add.1
(Feb. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2010].
98 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 153; see also Lucien A.
Bebehuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775,
776 (1988).
99 See Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 2-4.
100 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 420.
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bers are better understood in a forum with collective knowledge of all
the proceedings.1" 1
(iv) Hegemony
Consolidating MEGs exacerbates more developed nations'
("MDNs") hegemony over international bankruptcy law. Some com-
mentators have reasoned that State A should not complain when State
B's laws govern State A's assets because State A's laws will apply in
future situations.10 2 This view is known as the "rough wash." 3 The
COMI designation, however, favors MDNs where enterprises often
headquarter over less developed nations ("LDNs"), where enterprises
often operate. 10 4 The divergence between headquarters and opera-
tions means the laws of MDNs govern more international bankrupt-
cies because the debtor's registered seat, usually its headquarters, is
presumed to be its COMI. °5 Consolidating MEGs aggravates the di-
vergence because the headquarters of MEGs are even more likely to be
in a MDN.10 6 Because of this unequal spread of future international
bankruptcy cases, support among LDNs for Universalism should be
minimal unless LDNs believe that proceedings will be more evenly
spread in the future or they derive other benefits from MDNs adminis-
tering their enterprises or assets.1 0 7 In comparison, under Territorial-
ism, LDNs can administer local assets and enterprises using their
local laws. 08 Therefore, LDNs may favor territorial administration of
MEGs and thereby limit cooperation in consolidated MEG cases.
(v) Establishment issues
The requirement of an establishment for recognition of a Main
or Non-Main Proceeding could hinder MEG consolidations. A precon-
dition for recognition of a foreign proceeding is that the debtor must
have an establishment in the foreign jurisdiction.10 9 MEG members
may not have an establishment, however, in the COMI of the Group.
Without an establishment, a proceeding will not be recognized and
101 Irit Mevorach, The Road to a Suitable and Comprehensive Global Approach to
Insolvencies for Multinational Corporate Groups, 15 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
5, art. 1 (2006).
102 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through
Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2274 (2000).
103 See Pottow, From Greed to Pride, supra note 68, at 1921-22.
104 Id. at 1922.
105 Tung, supra note 5; Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 16(3).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 775, 806 (1999).
109 Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 17(2)(b).
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Model Law-based relief cannot be granted.1 1 ° Non-US Model Law en-
actors may have more flexibility when confronted with a Non-Recog-
nized Proceeding because some can provide additional assistance or
comity to facilitate a foreign court's administration of domestic as-
sets.1 1 1 In contrast, chapter 15 does not allow additional assistance or
comity in the absence of recognition.1 1 2
Recognition is the key that unlocks the relief available under
the Model Law; while a Non-Recognized Proceeding must use comity
or other common law doctrines to obtain any relief. Article seven of
the Model Law states that "[n] othing in this Law limits the power of a
court... to provide additional assistance to a foreign representative
under other laws of this State."' 1 3 Therefore, a State that has enacted
Article seven can provide other aid, including comity, to a foreign pro-
ceeding regardless of a lack of establishment. For instance, both En-
glish and Australian courts recognized a Cayman Islands liquidation
even though the debtor lacked an establishment in the Cayman Is-
lands.11 4 In the MEG context, a country which adopts Article seven of
the Model Law can provide assistance to the COMI of the Group with-
out recognition. Although this avenue requires assistance from the
State where the assets are located, any solution short of pure Univer-
salism requires some comity to administer assets located outside of a
proceeding's jurisdiction.1 1 ' MEGs, by nature, have assets outside of
the COMI of the Group and require comity and assistance to
consolidate.
Chapter 15 abolishes any additional assistance or comity-based
discretionary power, making all relief contingent upon recognition and
the prerequisite of an establishment. 1 16 As one commentator states,
110 Id. art. 21(1).
... Id. art. 7.
112 See infra Part JI(v)(b).
113 Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 7.
114 Sandy Shandro, A Plea for the Amendment of Chapter 15, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Mar. 2009, at 48, 49, 63; see also In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R.
37, 42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing the English High Court of Justice's
granting of recognition for Cayman Island liquidation even though it was "not an
UNCITRAL type proceeding" and it "did not determine COMI").
115 "The English court would be entitled to exercise its discretion by remitting the
assets to the principal jurisdiction and leaving it to apply its own law." McGrath,
[2008] UKHL at [25] (emphasis added).
116 MEGs are just one example of a non-recognized proceeding. Other examples
include the possibility that a COMI country may be unsuitable due to an inability
to obtain jurisdiction over creditors or the local bar may be insufficiently versed in
complex insolvency law or too corrupt. See Bufford, Tertiary, supra note 64, at 166-
71 (stating that although Avianca would not have been a tertiary proceeding, the
main case was held in the United States in spite of the debtor's much smaller
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"Chapter 15 and § 103(k) deny virtually all relief to foreign representa-
tives in non-qualifying foreign proceedings."1 1 7 Section 1507 of the
Code precludes a foreign representative from seeking any assistance
under any United States law unless it is granted recognition.1 1 8 Al-
though strongly at odds with the section 1501's focus on coopera-
tion,11 9 "[c]hapter 15 is intended to be the exclusive door to ancillary
assistance to foreign proceedings. The goal is to concentrate control of
these questions in one court." 2 ° Therefore, if a foreign MEG based in
State A has an operating affiliate in the United States but the affiliate
does not have an establishment in State A, the COMI of the Group, a
United States bankruptcy court will not only deny recognition to the
COMI of the Group, but also deny other comity or assistance.121 Com-
mentators have suggested solutions to the discrepancy between the
Model Law and chapter 15, including an amendment1 22 and a broader
interpretation of establishment. 1 23 Although a full consideration of
this predicament is outside the scope of this article, to fully effectuate
a MEG solution, such as the Economic Integration Test, the United
presence due to its ability to obtain jurisdiction over creditors in the United
States). But see In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458
B.R. 63, 82 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that no court has endorsed tertiary
proceedings). Form B1, the cover sheet for a voluntary petition, only allows a
debtor to seek recognition as a foreign Main Proceeding or a foreign Non-Main
Proceeding.
117 Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 47, at 299-305.
118 11 U.S.C. § 1507 (2006).
119 Chapter 15 has the "objectives of cooperation between courts of the United
States... and the courts and other competent authorities of foreign countries in-
volved in crossborder insolvency cases." Id. at § 1501(a); see also In re Atlas Ship-
ping, 404 B.R. 726, 740 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the increased emphasis on
comity in Chapter 15).
120 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
173.
121 In re Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund,
Ltd., 389 B.R. 325, 333-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("A foreign proceeding should
not be entitled direct access to or assistance from the host country courts unless
the debtor had a sufficient pre-petition economic presence in the country of the
foreign proceeding."); see also Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1026 (5th
Cir. 2010) ("The plain language of Chapter 15 requires a factual determination
with respect to recognition before principles of comity come into play."); In re Brit-
ish American Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
122 Timothy T. Brock, Canada's "Northern Lights" Could Dispel Shadow of Bear
Sterns over Ch. 15 Practice, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34-35 (2011) (arguing for a
deletion of the term "establishment" from Chapter 15); Shandro, supra note 114,
at 63.
123 Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 47, at 302-03 (noting the different definitions of
establishment in the Model Law compared to Chapter 15 could serve as grounds
for a more expansive interpretation).
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States should allow some basis for assistance or comity to debtors lack-
ing an establishment at the COMI of the Group. 124 Stripped of any
ability to assist such proceedings, the rough wash is compromised.
Some States may be unwilling to allow their enterprises or assets to be
administered in consolidated MEG proceedings in the United States
using the Economic Integration Test, or any other framework, because
of the lack of reciprocity.
II. CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ATTEMPTED FIXES
Part II first outlines the respect of the Insolvency Regimes for
corporate separateness. Then, it highlights the problems of parallel
proceedings by analyzing the Parmalat/Eurofood insolvency. Lastly, it
considers the three solutions which currently facilitate MEG coordina-
tion and consolidation: protocols, an expanded definition of COMI, also
known as "'de facto consolidation,"12 and synthetic secondary
proceedings.
The Insolvency Regimes respect corporate separateness by fo-
cusing their jurisdictional queries on the COMI of each MEG member.
Under the Model Law, "the debtor's registered office... is presumed to
be the [COMI]."126 Therefore, each member has a separate COMI de-
termination. 127 The UNCITRAL Guide on Insolvency Law (the "UN-
CITRAL Guide")1 2 attempts to provide further guidance on the
treatment of corporate groups in insolvency, but in doing so becomes
124 In contrast, if a U.S. based debtor-subsidiary has an establishment in the for-
eign jurisdiction where the corporate parent is based and where it has filed for
bankruptcy, a U.S. bankruptcy court may grant the foreign proceeding the status
of the Main Proceeding of the debtor-subsidiary. In re RHTC Liquidating Co., 424
B.R. 714 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2010); see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Model
Law in the United States: COMI and Groups, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY IN-
STITUTUTE, COORDINATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE GROUP INSOLVENCIES:
SOLVING THE COMI ISSUE 10 (2010), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/compo-
nentjdownloads/?task=view.download&cid=3882.
125 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 181.
126 Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 16(3).
127 See Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency, U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade
Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), 32d Sess., T 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.76/Add.2 (Mar. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Treatment of Corporate
Groups 2007]; Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of En-
terprise Groups in Insolvency, UNCITRAL, Working Group V (Insolvency Law),
35th sess., T 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.82/Add.4 (Sept. 10, 2008) [hereinafter
Legislative Guide on Involvency Law 2008].
128 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2004).
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fixated on the complexities associated with MEGs 129 and the obstacles
presented by substantive consolidation and intergroup debts. 130
Nonetheless, the pervasive theme of corporate separateness through-
out the UNCITRAL Guide only strengthens the plain language of the
Model Law. The EC Regulation presumes that the debtor's COMI is
located at its registered office.' 31 According to the Virgos-Schmidt Re-
port, the default rule is to open proceedings for each entity in a corpo-
rate group. 132 In Eurofood, the European Court of Justice reinforced
the EC Regulation's respect for corporate separateness. 133 Eurofood
was a wholly owned shell corporation created for cash flow manage-
ment purposes. 134 Even though the separateness between Eurofood
and its corporate parent, Parmalat, was largely illusory, "[t]he [Euro-
pean Court of Justice] stated that 'each debtor constituting a distinct
legal entity is subject to its own court jurisdiction.' In consequence,
the COMI of each legal entity must be determined separate from the
COMI of any related entity in the corporate group."'135
Eurofood illustrates the EC Regulation's ability to mitigate the
problem of parallel proceedings. In the wake of the Parmalat MEG
collapse at the end of 2003, its subsidiaries throughout Europe filed for
bankruptcy.1 36 Eurofood first filed in Ireland where liquidation pro-
ceedings were commenced and later in Italy where restructuring be-
gan. ' Both the Irish courts and the Italian courts believed that
Eurofood's COMI was within their respective jurisdictions, which lead
to an appeal of the cases to the European Court of Justice.1 38 The Eu-
ropean Court of Justice held that once a proceeding decides the COMI
of an entity, Ireland in Eurofood, the decision is automatically recog-
129 The Legislative Guide begins, "[r] eflecting the complexity of this topic, the dis-
cussion that follows is intended only as a brief introduction to some of these issues
S. . " Id. at 277.
130 See id. at 276-78.
131 EC Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 3(1).
132 Virgos & Schmit Report, supra note 6, at 53. The Virgos and Schmit Report
was originally supposed to be the authorized guide for the 1995 EU Convention on
Insolvency. Even though the EU Convention was never actually adopted, the EC
Regulation largely copies the EU Convention. Hence, the Report remains a valua-
ble interpretive resource. See Ragan, supra note 74, at 168 n.198 (2010).
133 See Winkler, From Whipped Cream, supra note 87, at 365.
134 Id. at 357.
135 Samuel L. Bufford, Center of Main Interests, International Insolvency Case
Venue, and Equality of Arms: The Eurofood Decision of the European Court of Jus-
tice, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 351, 406 n.364 (2007) (quoting Case C- 341104,
Bondi v. Bank of Am. (Eurofood IFSC Ltd.), 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813, at 30).
136 See Winkler, From Whipped Cream, supra note 87, at 354.
137 See id. at 355-56.
138 See id. at 356.
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nized and binding upon all other member states. 13 9 Eurofood's re-
quirement of automatic recognition short-circuits parallel
proceedings. 140
The Model Law does not attempt automatic recognition of a
Main Proceeding. 4 ' With neither the overarching framework of the
European Union nor a final arbiter like the European Court of Justice,
parallel proceedings may occur under the Model Law.' 42 Like the
game-theoretic-based arguments leveled against the turnover of assets
required for Universalism, 4 ' deferring to another State's claim of ju-
risdiction over members of a MEG is irrational under a prisoner's di-
lemma. Unless curbed by a belief in the rough wash or other benefits
of consolidated proceedings, an equilibrium of mutual defection results
with States opening parallel proceedings for MEG members where the
individual members have their respective COMIs, irrespective of the
COMI of the Group.
Protocols represent a limited but flexible avenue for aiding co-
operation and communication in MEG insolvency cases. Protocols are
court-authorized multiparty agreements facilitating cooperation and
coordination of concurrent cross-border bankruptcy proceedings.14 4
They attempt to overcome conflicts between variations in bankruptcy
regimes and are especially helpful in coordinating proceedings that ap-
ply different standards for the debtor's continued operation.145 One of
the strengths of protocols is their flexibility because they permit the
court to customize the protocol to the debtor. 14 ' Furthermore, their
use is not limited to signatories of the Model Law. 147
139 See Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of Am. (Eurofood IFSC Ltd.), 2006 E.C.R. I-
3813 41, 42.
140 Compare id. at 41, 42, with EC Regulation, supra note 5, at art. 16(2).
141 Model Law, supra note 4, at art. 17.
142 See Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 391.
143 See Fredrick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L.
31, 100-01 (2001).
144 See Zumbro, supra note 2, at 157-58.
145 Id. at 161. On the one hand, some jurisdictions, including the United States,
usually allow a debtor-in-possession to operate the entity while insolvency pro-
ceedings are ongoing. On the other hand, some European jurisdictions, including
Ireland, require liquidation of a debtor's business in a very short time without the
input of the debtor. See generally Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of Am. (Eurofood
IFSC Ltd.), 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813 (serving as an example of such a conflict between
variations in bankruptcy regimes).
146 Johnson & Han, supra note 3, at 811-12.
147 Compare In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), and District
Court of Jerusalem, Case No. 1595/87 (May 23, 1996), available at http:ll
www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/395/1529.html (describing
Cross-Border Insolvency Protocol between United States and Israel, specifically
that after alleged violation of the automatic stay through opening of a second pro-
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Some commentators have shortsightedly maintained that pro-
tocols are the best solution for coordinating MEG bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Proponents of protocols pinpoint the current impossibility of a
Universal bankruptcy regime as the most important reason for the
supremacy of protocols. 148 The protocol-governed coordination and
communication, however, may be insufficient to overcome differences
between national laws. 14 9 For instance, when substantive laws differ
markedly and a protocol fails to address post-petition financing, or
only uses general language, the potential for post-commencement fi-
nancing may be limited. 5 ' In reality, both protocols and procedural
consolidation require the blessing of multiple jurisdictions. 5 ' Comity
is as much a prerequisite for a consolidated proceeding as it is for a
protocol. Consolidation under the substantive law of the COMI of the
Group, nevertheless, will overcome all differences between national
laws because only one substantive law will apply.
European Union courts have used de facto consolidation to con-
solidated MEGs. De facto consolidation expands the definition of
COMI to allow all the group members' COMIs to be located in the
same State. One famous example involved the Daisytek-ISA group.' 5 2
An English court seized jurisdiction over a number of subsidiaries with
COMIs arguably in either France or Germany.15 3 Although French
and German courts attempted to seize jurisdiction, on appeal, French
ceeding in Israel (a nonsignatory to the Model Law), a cross border protocol was
negotiated which led to cooperation for investigating, preserving and marshalling
the debtor's assets), with In re Gold & Honey Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 368-69 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2009) (reviewing the second proceeding brought in Israel in opposition to
the earlier automatic stay issued in the United States but even after reviewing
Nakash, the Israeli court tried to continue liquidation proceedings).
148 Johnson & Han, supra note 3, at 811; Zumbro, supra note 2, at 160.
149 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 186.
150 Draft UNCITRAL Notes on Cooperation, Communication and Coordination in
Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings, United Nations Comm. on Int'l. Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), 35th Sess., T1 136, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/WG.V/WP.83 (Sep. 2, 2008) (evidencing an example of general language
given by the working group, specifically, the "authoriz[ation for] the applicants to
pursue all avenues of refinancing and the sale of material parts of their business
or assets, subject to prior approval of the court and the lenders.").
151 Jamie Altman, A Test Case in International Bankruptcy Protocols: The Leh-
man Brothers Insolvency, 12 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 463, 493 (2011) ("Ultimately, no
matter how expertly a protocol is drafted, and no matter how well it should work
in theory, a protocol is of no value if parties refuse to adopt it.").
152 Id.
153 In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562, [20041 B.P.I.R. 30, 2003 WL
21353254, at *1 (Ch.D.) (U.K.). Similarly, in the Schefenack and Deutsche Nickel
Insolvencies German holding companies were found to have COMIs in England.
Adam Gallagher, European Insolvency Regulation: German Court Blesses Change
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and German courts upheld the original English COMI designation
based upon the corporate parent's COMP.5 4 The German PIN insol-
vency represents the most creative use of de facto consolidation.155
The Cologne District Insolvency Court allowed a Luxembourg subsidi-
ary to reincorporate in Germany for the expressed purpose of changing
its bankruptcy case's location.15 6 Although the bankruptcy court
noted the potential pitfalls of forum shopping for COMI, it found that
the German venue benefited creditors and increased the potential for a
successful reorganization. 15 7
De facto consolidation is too flexible, and unguided, for effective
use as a test for consolidation of MEGs. The importance of consolida-
tion derives from potential group-wide solutions, and de facto consoli-
dation does not necessarily analyze if such a solution would be in each
member's best interest. 15 8 If a group-wide solution is not in the best
interest of a group member, then its individual COMI, or the proceed-
ings controlling its assets, would not provide comity or other assis-
tance. Consequently, the Main Proceeding for the de facto
consolidation would not be able to administer the group member's as-
sets. Although comity is also a necessity for the Economic Integration
Test, if the COMI of the Group analyzes and finds increased potential
for a group-wide solution in a consolidated proceeding, such analysis
and findings could make recognition of the COMI of the Group by a
foreign proceeding more acceptable.
Synthetic secondary proceedings offer a potential avenue for
consolidation but they have significant limitations.1 5 9 In In re Collins
& Aikman Eur. S.A. ("Collins & Aikman"), the English court fore-
of COMI to Bolster Cross-Border Group Restructuring, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30,
49 (2008).
154 See Gabriel Moss, Group Insolvency - Choice of Forum and Law: The European
Experience under the Influence of English Pragmatism, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1005,
1010-12 (2007) (describing the Daisytek cases in England, France, and Germany).
More recently, French courts have adopted the English view. The EMTECT MEG
had subsidiaries in both Belgium and Germany who were largely administered by
the French parent. Even though the subsidiaries' assets and registration were lo-
cated in Belgium and Germany, the French court found that they had French
COMIs. See Gallagher, supra note 153, at 47-49.
155 See Gallagher, supra note 153, at 47-48.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 48.
15s Although one would hope that a proceeding would only seize jurisdiction to aid
a MEG's restructuring or sale, more invidious concerns such as pride or even
worse the lure of simply presiding over a high profile bankruptcy case may prevail.
See LoPucKi, COURTING FAILURE, supra note 33, at 36, 210.
159 Pottow, A New Role, supra note 59, at 581-83 (coining the term "synthetic sec-
ondary proceeding").
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stalled the opening of Non-Main proceedings in Spain by carving out a
special claim category for Spanish creditors so they would receive the
treatment they would have received in Spain.'6 ° With Pride restored,
Spanish creditors were more willing to accept administration of claims
in England. If this solution becomes widely used, the potential for con-
solidated proceedings will improve because creditors will have less
reason to open secondary proceedings and consolidation will be more
acceptable. 161
Will synthetic secondary proceedings extinguish Non-Main
Proceedings and make the Economic Interest Test unnecessary? Even
its advocates admit this is not the case. Some priorities are not politi-
cally viable for another regime to apply. 16 2 Moreover, unlike Collins
and Aikman, a carve-out could disrupt distributions of domestic credi-
tors of the Main Proceeding.' 6 3 Instead, synthetic secondary proceed-
ings should be viewed as complimentary to the Economic Integration
Test. In Collins & Aikman, the consolidation was also driven by the
need to "continue to trade the businesses, fund the administrations
and conduct sales processes on a group-wide basis. ' 164 By analyzing
the potential for group-wide solutions and the feasibility of members'
bankruptcies, the Economic Integration Test covers all three of these
considerations. Therefore, the Economic Integration Test can work
with the creation of synthetic secondary proceeding to help obtain com-
ity. Or, if a synthetic secondary proceeding cannot be created, the Eco-
nomic Integration Test could potentially inspire comity by itself.
III. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS
Part III considers potential solutions for administering MEGs.
First, it will analyze the evolution of the UNCITRAL Working Group
V's (the "Working Group") conclusions. These conclusions exhibited
Universalist promise, but over time, they became watered-down by
Territiorialist concerns. Next, it outlines the first proposed consolida-
tion rule for MEGs; the American Law Institute's "Transnational In-
solvency Principles of Cooperation among NAFTA countries"' (the
160 Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWIHC (Ch) 1343 [41] (Eng.); see also Pottow, A New
Role, supra note 59, at 584-86 (discussing Collins & Aikman).
161 See Pottow, A New Role, supra note 59, at 584-586 (explaining that Non-Main
proceedings are often derived from a concern about differences in priorities for
local creditors).
162 Id. at 586-89 (discussing why nonmonetary relief should not be considered in a
synthetic secondary proceedings because it is too divisive).
163 Id. at 592.
164 Collins & Aikman, [2006] EWHC at [8]; see Pottow, A New Role, supra note 59,
at 591-92.
165 In February 2006, the American Law Institute and the Interna-
tional Insolvency Institute (III) announced the inception of a
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"NAFTA Principles"). It also weighs the suggestions of Irit Mevorach,
an advisor to the Working Group and a preeminent scholar of MEGs.
Each of these three frameworks have flaws, however, that the Eco-
nomic Integration Test remedies. Lastly, the treatment of MEGs as
part of Professor Edward J. Janger's theory, Virtual Territority, is also
examined. The Economic Integration Test could be incorporated into
his framework.
A. The Working Group
Realizing the shortcomings of the Model Law's framework for
MEGs, UNCITRAL designated Working Group V to propose and eval-
uate possible changes to the treatment of MEGs to encourage "cost re-
duction of parallel proceedings; coordination of a global sale of assets;
maximization of the value of all group members; minimization of fo-
rum shopping; and global reorganization of the group."166 They pro-
duced the Proposed Legislative Guide, 16 7 a set of recommendations for
better administration of MEG bankruptcies under the current Model
Law provisions and by amending the Model Law. The Working Group
appeared to be focused on a Universalist solution of an Enterprise
Group COMI, or a COMI of the Group, to consolidate all members' pro-
ceedings. 1 6' The Working Group found the obstacles for creating a
COMI of the Group concept too daunting. In particular, four specific
problems proved insurmountable: 1) defining how the COMI of the
Group would be decided, 169 2) defining the degree of integration neces-
joint dissemination and extension project with respect to the
"Principles of Cooperation" developed in the ALI Transnational
Insolvency Project. The stated objective of the two bodies was to
establish acceptance of the ALI's Principles of Cooperation
Among the NAFTA Countries (NAFTA Principles) in jurisdictions
across the world, subject to any necessary local modifications,
and to obtain the endorsement of leading domestic associations,
courts, and other groups in those jurisdictions.
Ian F. Fletcher, Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global
Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
767, 777 (2007).
166 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 389.
167 Id. at 367-70 (providing a detailed analysis of the Working Group).
168 Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency, United Nations Comm. on Int'l.
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group V (Insolvency Law), 31st Sess., T 33(b),
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.74 (Oct. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Treatment of Corporate
Groups 20061.
169 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise
Groups in Insolvency, United Nations Comm. on Int'l. Trade Law [UNCITRAL],
Working Group V (Insolvency Law), 35th Sess., 91 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/
WP.82/Add.4 (Sept. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law
20081.
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sary for the COMI of the Group to be used, 7 ° 3) the great potential for
parallel proceedings because of the lack of worldwide automatic recog-
nition,' 7 1 and 4) the necessity of widespread adoption and enforce-
ment. 172 Eventually, the Working Group focused on less controversial
measures to aid coordination and cooperation between courts and rep-
resentatives in the different bankruptcy proceedings of a MEG. 173
The Proposed Legislative Guide suggests increased cooperation
and coordination between courts, representatives, and parties in MEG
proceedings while still protecting the substantive and procedural
rights of parties and the independence of courts.174 Some less contro-
versial suggestions include expanded use of protocols, 7 5 encourage-
ment of greater direct communication, and document sharing between
proceedings.176 A more radical suggestion is the appointment of a sin-
gle representative for all, or at least some, of the members of a
MEG.17 7 The notes accompanying the recommendation highlight the
importance of deciding whether a single representative is appropriate.
They advocate a two-step process. First, decide whether an entire
MEG is sufficiently integrated and if so, decide whether the relation-
ship between the parent and the specific subsidiaries is appropriate for
a single representative's oversight.'17 When deciding whether a MEG
is sufficiently integrated, the relevant factors are: (a) "The holding,
whether directly or indirectly, of a specified percentage of capital or
votes" of group members; (b) The ability to determine "financial and
operating policy and decision making" of group members; (c) "The
ability to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors or gov-
erning [officials of group members]"; (d) "The ability to cast or regulate
the casting of, a majority of the votes that are likely to be cast at a
170 Id. at 13.
171 See Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Thirty-
Eighth Session (New York, 19-23 April 2010), United Nations Comm. on Int'l.
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], 43d Sess., 63-83 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/691 (April 19-23,
2010) (approved with only minor textual changes the substance of Working Group
V (Insolvency Law)) [hereinafter Report of Working Group 20101; Legislative
Guide on Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 5 & 6.
172 Report of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of Its Thirty-Fifth
Session (Vienna, 17-21 Nov. 2008), United Nations Comm. on Int'l Trade Law
[UNCITRAL], 42d Sess., T 26 & 27, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/666 (Dec. 2, 2008) [herein-
after Report of Working Group 2008].
173 Id.
174 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 72.
175 Id. at 89.
176 Id. at 82.
177 Id. at 81.
178 Id. at 85.
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general meeting of [a group member], irrespective of whether that ca-
pacity arises through shares or options.' 7 9
These factors are instructive and should form part of any anal-
ysis of a MEG's integration. Analyzing corporate governance is insuf-
ficient, however, to decipher whether it will be in the best interests of
the individual members to take part in a group-based solution. The
Economic Integration Test incorporates the Working Group's factors
but they only comprise part the Interests of the Group analysis.
B. NAFTA Principles
The NAFTA Principles were the first proposed framework for
consolidating MEG bankruptcy proceedings. In 2003, the American
Law Institute developed the NAFTA Principles to accelerate conver-
gence amongst United States, Canadian, and Mexican bankruptcy
laws." ° Two of the NAFTA Principles focus on MEGs. NAFTA Proce-
dure Principle 23 allows a subsidiary to file for bankruptcy in the same
jurisdiction as its corporate parent.' 8l The substantive law of the par-
ent would also govern whether the subsidiary was procedurally or sub-
stantively consolidated unless a proceeding was opened at the COMI of
the subsidiary. In that case, coordination between the two proceedings
"should achieve the benefits of consolidation where possible.' 2 Pro-
cedure Principle 24 suggests that respect for corporate form could limit
consolidation or coordination if parallel proceedings are opened in the
COMI of the parent and the COMI of the subsidiary. S3 The NAFTA
Principles are over-inclusive, as they do not require an analysis of the
relationships between the group members. Consolidating a MEG
179 Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency 2006, supra note 168, at T 35-
38.180 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Jacob S. Ziegel, The American Law Institute
NAFTA Insolvency Project, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1997).
181 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA
COUNTRIES (2003) (listing Procedural Principle 23, Coordination with Subsidiaries:
"It should be permissible to file bankruptcy for a subsidiary in the same jurisdic-
tion as the parent's bankruptcy, and to have either procedural or substantive con-
solidation under applicable law, absent a proceeding involving the subsidiary in
the country of its main interests. Where the subsidiary is in a parallel proceeding
in the country of its main interests, coordination between the two proceedings
should achieve the benefits of consolidation where possible.").
182 Id.
183 Id. (listing Procedural Principle 24: Principles as Applied to Subsidiaries. "The
principles of coordination and cooperation should include parallel proceedings in-
volving a subsidiary of a foreign parent debtor to the same extent as with parallel
proceedings involving the debtor, although certain decisions, such as allocation of
value, may be differently determined because of the need to honor the corporate
form.").
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whose members are not strongly linked unnecessarily infringes on the
Pride of the States whose proceedings are consolidated. The Economic
Integration Test's analysis of the Interests of the Group focuses on
whether a group solution will be in the best interests of each group
member.
C. Mevorach
Mevorach suggests a test of business integration and asset in-
tegration to decide whether a MEG should be procedurally consoli-
dated, substantively consolidated, or neither. When a MEG has assets
and debts mixed amongst the members ("asset integrated"), Mevorach
argues that substantive consolidation should be applied to collapse all
the liabilities and assets of each group member into one estate.184
Substantive consolidation saves procedural costs and facilitates group
solutions by applying only one law.1 " 5 Additionally, it reflects the eco-
nomic reality for creditors, who, due to the intermingling of assets and
inter-group debts of an asset integrated MEG, must analyze the
MEG's operations when monitoring an individual member."8 6 A "busi-
ness integrated" MEG that is not asset integrated should be procedur-
ally consolidated. 8 7 The test for business integration is the strength
of the links between entities and whether a coordinated solution would
benefit the enterprise. ' A business integrated MEG bankruptcy
would be based in one State and that State's substantive insolvency
law would apply to the case. The separateness of each entity would be
respected, however, and the assets and liabilities of each entity would
remain partitioned."9 If the MEG is neither asset integrated nor bus-
iness integrated ("nonintegrated"), then the members would file sepa-
rate bankruptcies in their respective COMIs."9 ° Consolidation of
nonintegrated MEGs would unnecessarily infringe upon the Pride of
States who could hold proceedings for individual group members.1 91
The three categories used by Mevorach are well designed. The only
problem is the availability of substantive consolidation, a very contro-
versial doctrine.'9 2 A further level of analysis may be necessary to
quell creditor unrest and make substantive consolidation more palat-
184 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 225.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 226.
187 Id. at 159.
188 Id. at 153-59.
189 Id. at 165-66.
190 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 377-78.
191 Id.192 Id. Mevorach makes an excellent point that creditors of an asset integrated
MEG should not be surprised if it is substantively consolidated because the corpo-
rate petitioning is a mere facade. Id. at 377.
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able, a prime concern in a world where comity is a precondition to any
consolidated MEG framework.
Mevorach's adaptive framework mirrors a MEG's bankruptcy
proceedings to how it operated prior to bankruptcy. Using a sliding
scale, the more centralized a MEG, the more centralized its bank-
ruptcy proceedings.19 3 If a parent operated with very centralized con-
trol over its affiliates, then the MEG's bankruptcy proceedings would
be very centralized and Non-Main proceedings may not even be
opened. A more decentralized, yet still business integrated, group
would feature Non-Main proceedings for its affiliates coordinated by
the COMI of the Group. Mevorach suggests a number of factors for
determining the level of centralization: the size of the group, the type
of product the group produces, the group's target market, and owner-
ship of the group's subsidiaries."' Although the framework should be
commended for moving away from a mechanical test requiring a pre-
scribed level of ownership,1 95 it is too flexible and difficult to apply. 96
The three-step approach of deciding 1) the level of consolidation, 2) the
level of integration, and 3) what type of proceedings matches with the
level of integration, creates unnecessary uncertainty. Although the
first two steps are necessary, the last, although optimal in a Univer-
salist system, obscures an already difficult analysis. Translating the
level of integration to the level of oversight would be difficult and the
bifurcation of procedural and substantive consolidation would already
distinguish extremely integrated MEGs from their lesser integrated
brethren. 197
D. Janger and Virtual Territoriality
Professor Janger's theory, Universal Proceduralism, could in-
corporate an analysis of the economic integration of MEGs. 9 s The
193 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 174-94.
194 Id. at 133.
195 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 29 (noting the
greater importance of the substance of relationships between group members
rather than the form of those relationships).196 Eva M.F. de Vette, Comment, Multinational Enterprise Groups in Insolvency:
How Should the European Union Act?, 7 UTRECHT L. REV. 216, 224 (2011).
197 Id.198 Universal Proceduralism is a new theory and although it is certainly not half
baked, it has not been as thoroughly vetted as Modified Universalism. Therefore,
where the line between procedural and substance falls is still uncertain. See
Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 15, at 435 ("Essential procedures to be
determined by the law of the forum might include. . .") (emphasis added). Hence,
whether the sale of a MEG, such as under § 363, would be characterized as proce-
dural and the law of the COMI of the Group would apply is also unclear. See id.
(noting that the "scope of discharge (subject to best interests)" is procedural).
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COMI of the Group would consolidate all the member's proceedings. 199
On one hand, the COMI of the Group's law would apply to the adminis-
trative and procedural aspects of the case. On the other hand, the
COMI of the Group would apply the law of the foreign members'
COMIs and the States where their assets are located "as if they [were]
filed in the COMI of the [foreign member]" 20 0 in a process known as
Virtual Territoriality. A recent empirical study has strengthened Vir-
tual Territoriality as priority differences may represent a far larger
problem than once thought.20 1 United States bankruptcy courts only
allowed a foreign court unfettered discretion to administer United
States-based assets in 9.1% of cases.20 2 In over 90% of the cases,
United States bankruptcy courts either refused to allow administra-
tion of the United States-based assets or placed significant limitations
on their administration. Requirements have included that United
States statutory priorities apply or that United States creditors be
paid in full.20 3 No less significantly, research also shows that almost
94% of the filings for recognition were granted.20 4 Thus, controversy
usually surrounds the type of relief, or substantive law, as opposed to
the jurisdictional, or procedural law. 20 5 Universal Proceduralism
seeks to relieve this pressure by applying the local law of the debtor's
assets when possible.
The Economic Integration analysis is compatible with Univer-
sal Proceduralism. Janger advocates for a "mandatory rule for choice
of forum."20 6 Although the COMI of the Group would comprise part of
this rule, a member's choice of forum is also impacted by whether a
group is economically integrated. If a MEG is not economically inte-
199 Id. at 434.
200 Id. Janger conclusively proclaims that this is "not much more difficult than
what happens when U.S. bankruptcy courts administer cases that have been ad-
ministratively but not substantively consolidated." Id. at 436. Even after Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), bankruptcy courts do apply state law in many
situations. However, bankruptcy is ruled mostly by the Code with state law filling
in the gaps. Applying another State's bankruptcy regime, without probable prior
experience, seems a far more difficult task.
201 Professor Westbrook estimated that United States bankruptcy courts would
act in a Universalist manner and accept other States' priorities in seventy five
percent of cases. Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational Financial Distress: The Last
Hurrah of Territorialism, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 327 (2005) (reviewing LYNN M.
LoPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)).
202 See Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evi-
dence from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29 Wis. INT'L L.J. 110 (2011).
203 Id. at 117-18.
204 Id. at 123-25.
205 See id. at 128-29.
206 Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 15, at 432.
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grated then it should not be consolidated because an infringement
upon Pride is unnecessary. Although Modified Universalism remains
the predominate theory and will probably remain in that position for
the foreseeable future,2 "7 if Universal Proceduralism were to sur-
mount it, an analysis such as the Economic Integration Test should
play a role for its mandatory choice of forum rule.
IV. COMI OF THE GROUP
Deciding the COMI of a single enterprise under the Model Law
can be difficult, and deciding the COMI of a MEG multiplies these dif-
ficulties. The COMI analysis of a single enterprise or a MEG presents
an inherent tension between flexibility, which promotes fairness and
hinders forum shopping, and predictability, which fulfills creditors'
reasonable expectations and lowers the derivative cost of capital. Both
the frameworks identified by the Working Group and Irit Mevorach
reasonably balance this tension. Although the COMI of the Group
could be part of an amendment to the Model Law,20  it could have
broader application. A proceeding could use either analysis as a guide
for whether to provide assistance to a Non-Recognized Proceeding pur-
suant to Article 7 of the Model Law.20 9 If a Recognized Proceeding
(either Main or Non-Main) finds that the Non-Recognized Proceeding
is actually the COMI of the Group, the Recognized Proceeding could
allow the administration of its assets by the COMI of the Group. Addi-
tionally, a State that has not enacted the Model Law could use the
COMI of the Group analysis to decide where a MEG's bankruptcy
should be consolidated.2 10
A. Working Group Test
Although the Working Group eventually decided not to apply
the term COMI to consolidated MEGs, it suggested an analogous test
for the coordination center of the group based on the rebuttable pre-
sumption of the seat of the controlling member.2 1 The Working
Group considered extending the concept of COMI to MEGs but found
the absence of automatic recognition would create an unacceptable
207 Leif M. Clark & Karen Goldstein, Sacred Cows: How to Care for Secured Credi-
tors' Rights in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 46 TEX. INT'L L.J. 513, 522-23 (2011)
(noting that another model is unlikely to displace Modified Universalism and the
Model Law due to the incredible investment of both effort and consensus-building
necessary to bring the Model Law to fruition).
208 See infra Part (IV)(B).
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Report of Working Group 2010, supra note 171, at 31.
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risk of parallel proceedings.2 1 2 Instead, it shunted the test into an
analysis of the coordination center of the group's location.2 1 3 To pro-
mote predictability, the analysis uses a rebuttable presumption of the
registered seat of the controlling group member to increase predict-
ability.2 4 To promote flexibility, the Working Group settled on a con-
sideration of multiple factors, which could collectively rebut the
presumption.21 5 The applicable factors include the locations of assets,
creditors, and substantive operations.2 1 6
B. Operational Head Office Factor
Irit Mevorach and Christoph Paulus suggest using the head of-
fice of the MEG as COMI of the Group. 217 Relevant considerations for
deciding the location of the head office include where the MEG con-
ducts executive meetings and the majority of procedural functions as
well as the location of the parent's registered office. 2 1 Focusing on the
head office should help alleviate forum shopping because formalities
such as the place of registration are more easily manipulated than a
physical headquarters.2 1 9 Using the head office of the MEG would not
drastically depart from current COMI analysis of individual multina-
tional enterprises because both analyses share many factors.2 2 °
Mevorach argues that the registered seat should not be the basis for
identifying the home country of a MEG due to entity separation. A
MEG is not actually registered in a particular country. 221 Each of its
separately registered members is a separate entity, while the MEG is
212 Id. 26-27.
213 Id. T 32.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise
Groups in Insolvency, United Nations Comm. on Int'l. Trade Law [UNCITRAL],
Working Group V (Insolvency Law), at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.85/Add.1
(March 6, 2009) [hereinafter Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 20091. A huge
issue noted by the Working Group was confusion regarding the factors to rebut the
presumption of the registered seat of the parent as the coordination center and the
factors for deciding whether sufficient integration existed between the parent and
subsidiaries to allow a group proceeding. Id. at 4.
217 See Gabriel Moss & Christoph G. Paulus, The European Insolvency Regulation
- The Case for Urgent Reform, 19 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1 (2006).
218 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 198.
219 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 402 n.191.
220 See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master
Fund Ltd., 389 B.R. 325, 333-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Basis Yield Alpha
Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Sphinx Ltd., 351 B.R.
103, 117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
221 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 30, at 143.
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not a recognized legal entity.2 2 2 Additionally, Mevorach suggests that
ad hoc contractualism could assist in situations where multiple rea-
sonable candidates exist.2 2 3
V. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF MEG PROCEEDINGS IN
THE UNITED STATES
An amendment to the Model Law could facilitate consolidated
MEG proceedings. Changes in the near future appear unlikely be-
cause the Working Group was considered the probable low adoption
rate of any strong Universalist measure for MEG consolidation and
the Group rejected the latest proposals.2 2 4 Yet, the United States need
not wait for an amendment because the Code's lax requirements for
filing already facilitate MEG proceedings in the United States. Com-
ity is still necessary, however, for consolidating MEG proceedings, and
analyzing economic integration could prove an important step for se-
curing the requisite comity. Allowing the United States to administer
a foreign bankruptcy may seem farfetched but States without signifi-
cant bankruptcy expertise could benefit from procedural consolidation
of their corporations or assets in the United States. The availability of
post-commencement financing in the United States further increases
its attractiveness. Part VI first examines the two types of consolida-
tion used in the United States: procedural and substantive. Then, a
potential amendment to the Model law and current ability of the
United States to administer MEGs are considered. Lastly, it analyzes
why other States would allow the United States to administer their
corporations and assets.
A. Consolidation
Although Consolidation of facilitates group-based MEG solu-
tions, comity is a vital consideration and solutions should be as palat-
able as possible. Therefore, procedural consolidation should be the
default consolidation approach as it leaves the corporate partitioning
between entities intact. Substantive consolidation, the collapsing of
group members' corporate partitioning, should only be employed when
all creditors will benefit.
Procedural consolidation, also known as joint administration or
administrative consolidation, saves costs, eases administration, and
applies one substantive bankruptcy law, while respecting corporate
separateness. In the United States, procedurally consolidated pro-
ceedings save time and money by using one trustee, one docket, and
222 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 194.
223 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 386.
224 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2008, supra note 127, at 12.
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one judge.225 A party in interest may move to procedurally consolidate
the proceedings of some, or all, debtor subsidiaries with the proceed-
ings of the debtor parent.22" The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure explicitly allow the procedural consolidation of debtor affiliates in
the same court.227 To aid procedural consolidation, once a debtor files
for bankruptcy in a district, venue in that district is also proper for any
affiliate of the debtor.22 ' Although unimportant in a domestic case be-
cause the Code is federal law, procedurally consolidating a MEG's for-
eign and domestic members in one court allows the same substantive
law to apply to all the procedurally consolidated members. When a
single law governs a MEG's insolvency proceedings, it helps effectuate
a group-wide solution such as a sale or reorganization.2 29 If a sale of
multiple entities or the entire MEG occurs, each group member sold
will be credited a pro-rata portion of the proceeds based on their con-
tribution to the sale price. 23" The group member's creditors will then
receive their portion of the proceeds, if any, based on secured, priority,
general unsecured, equity, or subordinated status.231 In re Aerovias
Nacionales de Columbia S.A. Avianca ("Avianca"),2 3 2 illustrates how
procedural consolidation is applied. The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York procedurally consolidated
both Avianca, a Columbian corporation, and Avianca, Inc., a United
States corporation.233 The corporate partitioning between the debtors
remained intact and the creditors remained distinct. The bankruptcy
court applied the Code to both debtors and jointly decided motions to
dismiss and rejection of leases. 23 4
Substantive consolidation, unlike procedural consolidation,235
infringes on MEG members' legal separateness. Substantive consoli-
225 In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). Cf. In re Marshall, 291 B.R. 855
(Bankr. C.D. Ca. 2003), affid, 403 B.R. 668 (C.D. Ca. 2009) (changing assignment
of judge to allow judicial economy for a very complex factual scenario where the
new judge was already assigned a case with significant factual overlap).
226 In re Apex Oil, 406 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2005); Grand Pier Ctr. LLC v. ATC
Group Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75672, at *35 (N.D. Ill Oct. 9, 2007) ("it is
commonplace for a large corporation to place some, but not all, of its subsidiaries
or affiliated entities into the consolidated reorganization.").
227 FED. R. BANKR. PRO. 1015.
228 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).
229 Legislative Guide of Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 4.
230 MEVORACH, INSOLVENCY WITHIN, supra note 13, at 165.
231 Id.
232 Avianca, 303 B.R. at 1.
233 Id.
234 Id. (ruling on a motion to dismiss); In re Avianca, 323 B.R. 879 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2005) (ruling on a motion to reject leases).
235 Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Leavitt Structural Tubing Co., 55 B.R. 710,
711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating "procedural consolidation is merely a matter of
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dation is an equitable doctrine used by bankruptcy courts to collapse
legally separate entities into one.23 6 The assets and liabilities of all
substantively consolidated entities are placed in one estate, inter-
group debts are eliminated, and creditors are combined.2 3 7 Because
the substantively consolidated entities undoubtedly have different ra-
tios of assets to liabilities and different amounts of priority claims,
substantive consolidation often significantly affects the returns of un-
secured creditors. 23 ' The doctrine's limited application derives from
the general view that "[t]he power to [substantively] consolidate
should be used sparingly."2 39 A leading treatise suggests that this
view is justified due to the potential harm to innocent creditors.2 4 °
Fulfilling creditors' expectation is a prime concern for any MEG frame-
work. Procedural consolidation would change the applicable bank-
ruptcy law; it would not destroy the legal separation between
entities.2 4 1 Some United States courts have approved substantive con-
solidation orders "only when separately accounting for the assets and
liabilities of the distinct entities will reduce the recovery of every credi-
tor-that is, when every creditor will benefit from the consolida-
convenience and cost saving; it does not confer a substantive rights."); see supra
Part II (b)(i) (suggesting that the facilitation of coordination and cooperation could
help ameliorate this issue); see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v.
Schwartzman (In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc.), 13 F.3d 122, 123-26 (4th Cir.
1993) (arguing that at least one commentator suggested procedural consolidation
could hinder participation by smaller creditors and employee groups in a foreign
jurisdiction); Janis Sarra, Oversight and Financing of Cross-Border Business En-
terprise Group Insolvency Proceedings, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J. 547, 571 (2009).
236 STAN BERNSTEIN ET AL., BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY: ESSENTIALS 211 (2009); Dennis
J. Connolly, John C. Weitnauer, & Jonathan T. Edwards, Current Approaches to
Substantive Consolidation: Owens Corning Revisited, 2009 ANN. SURv. BANKR. L.
pt. I § 9 (noting substantive consolidation is the bankruptcy equivalent of piercing
the corporate veil and is not found in the Code).
237 In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing
the most frequently stated reasons for substantive consolidation are the use of the
corporation as a mere instrumentality of another, to halt fraudulent transfers be-
tween debtors or the debtors are extremely intertwined); Forrest Pearce, Bank-
ruptcy-Remote Special-Purpose Entities and the Right of a Business To Waive Its
Ability to File for Bankruptcy, EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. (forthcoming) (citations
omitted).
238 2 ALAN N. RESNICK ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 105.09[1] [a] (16th ed.
2011).
239 Chem. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966).
240 RESNICK, supra note 238, at 105.09[1][d].
241 See Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 364, 399-404 (discussing
the acceptance of outcome differences as one of the most troubling requirements
for true universalism); see also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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tion."2 4 2 The same standard should be applied to consolidating
MEGs. 24 3 The importance of comity cannot be overstated and many
nations do not allow substantive consolidation or drastically limit its
application.24 4 Procedural consolidation would sufficiently concen-
trate proceedings to allow group-wide solutions using the same sub-
stantive law and, at the same time, fulfill the creditors' expectations of
corporate separateness where not all creditors will benefit from sub-
stantive consolidation.2 4 5
B. MEGs in America
UNCITRAL may eventually enact an amendment to the Model
Law to aid consolidation of MEGs.2 46 In the interim, the United
States can already consolidate MEGs because the Code has a low
threshold to satisfy statutory jurisdiction. Yet, as Yukos Oil illus-
trates, statutory jurisdiction itself is insufficient and comity is neces-
sary. In contrast, Lord Hoffman's opinion in In re HiH, as well as
other recent English cases, shows the potential for comity-based con-
solidated MEG proceedings. The Economic Interest Test could help
persuade a foreign proceeding to react like Lord Hoffman In re HiH as
opposed to the Russians in Yukos Oil.
Although the Working Group did not create an amendment to
the Model Law, as the number of enactors grows and MEG proceed-
ings between members become more prevalent, the pressure to create
a framework will increase. Many enactors of the Model Law impose a
reciprocity requirement on foreign debtors, which limits the influence
of the Model Law.24 7 The Proposed Legislative Guide is more gener-
ally applicable because its influence is not restricted to Model Law en-
actors.248 Therefore, as the Proposed Legislative Guide affects more
MEG bankruptcies, UNCITRAL may pursue an amendment once po-
tential adoption is sufficiently broad.
242 In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 214 (3d Cir. 2005).
243 Legislative Guide on Insolvency 2008, supra note 127, at 11, 14.
244 See de Vette, supra note 196, at 226 (noting the only European Union members
to allow substantive consolidation are France, Ireland, the Netherlands).
245 Id. at 227 (explaining that although this produces problems of Pride for States
who relinquish administration of assets under their territorial control, any MEG
solution short of a globally accepted Universalist regime will cause such problems
and the only real solution in comity and a belief in the rough wash).
246 See Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 369 (explaining the im-
portance of creating a "coherent international framework" not just a "set of recom-
mendations which allow considerable flexibility.").
247 Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 47, at 271 (citing H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at
113 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 175-76).
248 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 370.
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The predominate framework for consolidating MEGs focuses
primarily on deciding the COMI of the Group. Next, it examines the
degree of the group's integration to decide whether the group should be
consolidated. Finally, it considers which type of consolidation should
be applied. 24 9 The analysis for fleshing out this framework is now
available. Although a procedure or presumption for deciding recogni-
tion of the COMI of the Group would be required, scholars have al-
ready created two acceptable alternatives. 2 50  How economic
integration will be decided is analyzed in Part VI. As noted, procedu-
ral consolidation should be the default choice for consolidation. Addi-
tionally, to facilitate a bankruptcy court administration of assets
extraterritorially, the communication aiding measures suggested by
the Working Group should be added as well. 2 '1 Focusing on the
United States, the establishment issues posed by chapter 15's omis-
sion of Article 7 of the Model Law must be addressed to promote reci-
procity between the United States and other Model Law enactors.2 5 2
This could also be achieved if the United States Bankruptcy Court al-
lowed more unfettered administration of United States-based
assets.2 55
Nevertheless, under existing law, all members of a MEG may
file for bankruptcy in the United States. A foreign enterprise may file
a voluntary bankruptcy in the United States pursuant to § 301 of the
Code. 25 '4 Although filing itself is insufficient, the barriers to establish-
ing statutory jurisdiction are low. As one of the bases for statutory
jurisdiction, 255 § 109(a) only requires a debtor to have property in the
United States on the date the bankruptcy is filed.2 56 A negligible
249 See Mevorach, supra note 7 (outlining different approaches to consolidation);
Janger, Virtual Territoriality, supra note 15 (advocating similar approaches to
consolidation).
250 See supra Part III.
251 Report of Working Group 2008, supra note 172, at 82.
252 See Ranney-Marinelli, supra note 47, at 271 (citing H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1,
at 113 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 175-76); supra Part II(c)(v)(B)
(stating that, once this issue is rectified, the United States has a greater potential
to consolidate a MEG than other Model Law enactors because the United States
does not impose a reciprocity requirement on non-Model Law enactors).
253 See supra Part III (D).
254 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); see Evans v. Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft (In re Ev-
ans), 177 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing that a foreign entity
could have filed a voluntary petition pursuant to § 301 of the Code).
255 Constitutional jurisdiction is not necessarily coextensive with statutory juris-
diction. See Gmam Inv. Funds Trust v. Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes, S.A.
(In re Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes, S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011).
256 11 U.S.C. § 109(a); In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 37-39
(Bankr. D. Del. 2000) (finding that each group member must independently meet
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
amount of funds in a bank account,257 or an unearned retainer,258
even when deposited pre-petition to establish jurisdiction, 2 9 is suffi-
cient.26 ° A debtor also need not be insolvent to file for either chapter
11 (reorganization) 26 1 or chapter 7 (liquidation) protection.262 Even an
involuntary petition can be maintained against foreign debtors who
satisfy § 109.263 Although unlikely considering the necessity of comity
for any consolidated MEG solution, an involuntary filing could be re-
quired when a chapter 15 petition cannot be filed because a foreign
this requirement); Bank of Am. N.T. & S.A. v. Communications & Studies Interna-
tional, Ltd., 23 B.R. 1015 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
257 Global Ocean Carriers, 251 B.R. at 37-39.
258 Id. at 39; Indep. Eng'g Co., Inc. v. U.S. Tr. (In re Indep. Eng'g Co. Inc.), 232
B.R. 529, 533 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1999).
259 Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130, 132
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004). But see Marc Solomon, Foreign Companies and Affiliates
Under § 109: The Benefits and Risks of "Manufactured" Eligibility, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Sept. 2004, at 26, 58 (listing earlier cases where paltry bank accounts or
establishing a mailing address were held insufficient to satisfy § 109).
260 Even if a member of a MEG does not "manufacture jurisdiction" by opening a
bank account, it may satisfy § 109 by having a place of business in the United
States. 11 U.S.C. § 109. Bankruptcy courts have also set a very low bar to satisfy
this requirement. See Allan L. Gropper, Current Developments in International
Insolvency Law: A United States Perspective, 15 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 145,
169 (2006) ("[E]ven a miniscule amount of U.S. property may be sufficient to sus-
tain jurisdiction in the U.S. courts under [section] 109 of the Bankruptcy Code
.... "); Kurt A. Mayr, Enforcing Prepackaged Restructurings of Foreign Debtors
Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 469, 475-76 (2006)
(listing cases).
261 A Chapter 11 may also provide for a liquidation of the debtor pursuant to a
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4); Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 65, 67 (2007).
262 See In re The Bible Speaks, 65 B.R. 415, 424 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
263 Section 303 sets the requirements for an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303
(2006); Gmam Inv. Funds Trust v. Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes, S.A. (In re
Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes, S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(failing to dismiss an involuntary petition based upon satisfaction of § 109). The
district court noted that a constitutional basis for personal jurisdiction is required
and the if the debtor did not have minimum contacts, the power of the bankruptcy
court would be limited to in rem jurisdiction over the debtor's assets in the United
States (citing Burnham v. Sup. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990)). However, the court
suggested that the debtor may have purposely availed itself and thereby estab-
lished minimum contacts with the United States through its borrowings from U.S.
creditors and targeting of U.S. markets. Id.
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proceeding is not pending. 26 4 A foreign proceeding may not be pending
due to resistance of the debtors or a lack of proof of insolvency.2 65
As the Yukos Oil cases show, however, the filing of a MEG's
foreign members in the United States is not sufficient to consolidate
an MEG.2 6 6 Yukos Oil was Russia's largest oil company with approxi-
mately two hundred subsidiaries operating under the laws of Russia,
Cyprus, the United Kingdom, and the United States.2 6 7 In 2004, the
Russian Federation began to expropriate Yukos' assets using a retro-
active application of Russian tax law in a selective manner without
due process.2 68 To satisfy the retroactively assessed taxes, Yukos'
principal assets were to be auctioned off on December 19, 2004.269 In
an effort to halt the auction, Yukos filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
tion in the Southern District of Texas on December 14, 2004.270 The
bankruptcy court found that it had statutory jurisdiction over Yukos
because the debtor opened a bank account and made deposits which
satisfied § 109.271 In the same order, the bankruptcy court also issued
a temporary restraining order to stop the Russian auction and prohibit
certain entities from taking part. 2  The Russian government was un-
deterred and it held the auction as scheduled.2 7 3 The court granted a
subsequent motion to dismiss the debtors' cases based upon
§ 1112(b) 4. 2 " The court's § 1112(b) analysis evaluated the debtor's
264 Section 1504 requires an already commenced foreign proceeding to file a chap-
ter 15. 11 U.S.C. § 1504; see Mayr, supra note 260, at 472-73.
265 See generally Daniel M. Glosband, UNCITRAL's New Working Group on Insol-
vency Law, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2000, at 28 (noting that many countries re-
quire proof of insolvency which prolongs case commencement).
266 Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130, 132
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) [hereinafter Yukos I]; In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) [hereinafter Yukos Ill.
267 Yukos 11, 321 B.R. at 400 (stating that the Texas corporation, Yukos USA, Inc.,
was incorporated one day prior to the petition).
268 Dmitry Golobov & Joseph Tanega, Practitioner Note, Yukos Risk: The Double-
Edged Sword - A Case Note on International Bankruptcy Litigation and the Trans-
national Limits of Corporate Governance, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 557, 580 (2007).
269 Yukos 1, 320 B.R. at 132.
270 Id.
271 The court also relied upon the nationality of the Chief Financial Officer and
that the United States was the location for over fifteen percent of Yukos' stock. Id.
272 Id. at 137-38.
273 Matteo Winkler, Arbitration Without Privity and Russian Oil: The Yukos Case
Before the Houston Court, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 115, 119-20 (2006).
274 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) provides that:
on request of a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under
chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in
the best interests of creditors and the estate, for cause unless the
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good faith through an analysis of "the debtor's financial condition, mo-
tives, and local financial realities."27 5 The court found a lack of good
faith based on four conditions. First, the lack of bankruptcy purpose,
as the debtors only wanted to subordinate their tax debt and transfer
potential causes of action into a litigation trust, not reorganize.276
Second, administration and enforcement of the case was objectively fu-
tile given the lack of cooperation of the Russian Federation, and the
location of the Yukos' primary assets in Russia.277 Third, other pro-
ceedings existed involving the debtor including those in the European
court determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a
trustee or an examiner is in the best interests of creditors and
the estate.
Furthermore paragraph (b)(4) enumerates the a non-exhaustive list of "causes"
including:
(A) substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate
and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(B) gross mismanagement of the estate; (C) failure to maintain
appropriate insurance that poses a risk to the estate or to the
public; (D) unauthorized use of cash collateral substantially
harmful to 1 or more creditors; (E) failure to comply with an or-
der of the court; (F) unexcused failure to satisfy timely any filing
or reporting requirement established by this title or by any rule
applicable to a case under this chapter; (G) failure to attend the
meeting of creditors convened under section 341(a) or an exami-
nation ordered under rule 2004 of the Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure without good cause shown by the debtor;
(H) failure timely to provide information or attend meetings rea-
sonably requested by the United States trustee (or the bank-
ruptcy administrator, if any); (I) failure timely to pay taxes owed
after the date of the order for relief or to file tax returns due after
the date of the order for relief; (J) failure to file a disclosure state-
ment, or to file or confirm a plan, within the time fixed by this
title or by order of the court; (K) failure to pay any fees or charges
required under chapter 123 of title 28; (L) revocation of an order
of confirmation under section 1144; (M) inability to effectuate
substantial consummation of a confirmed plan; (N) material de-
fault by the debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
(0) termination of a confirmed plan by reason of the occurrence
of a condition specified in the plan; and (P) failure of the debtor
to pay any domestic support obligation that first becomes paya-
ble after the date of the filing of the petition.
11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1), (4) (2006).
275 Yukos II, 321 B.R. at 410 (citing In re Elmwood Dev. Co., 964 F.2d 508 (5th Cir.
1992)).
276 Id. at 411.
277 Id.
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Court of Human Rights and the arbitrazh courts of Russia. Finally,
"[t]he sheer size of Yukos, and correspondingly, its impact on the en-
tirety of the Russian economy weighs heavily in favor of allowing reso-
lution in a forum in which participation of the Russian government is
assured."2 7 9 Yukos illustrates the necessity of comity when a foreign
State controls the debtor's assets. 2 s0 Although, the § 1112(b) analysis
did not examine the economic integration of Yukos, the bankruptcy
purpose, futility, and necessity of comity inquiries all form part of the
Economic Integration Test.
An analysis of economic integration is vital to securing support
and comity from a foreign proceeding. The opening of a foreign pro-
ceeding at the COMI of the individual debtor and a subsequent Chap-
ter 15 filing in the United States could marginalize a filing under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. An analysis of the economic integration of
the MEG under the Economic Integration Test could help sway a for-
eign proceeding to consider the United States as the COMI of the
Group, even if the Model Law's analysis would find that a proceeding
in the United States is Non-Main or even Non-Recognized.2"' The Ec-
onomic Integration Test could also strengthen the argument for a
United States proceeding receiving common law-based comity from
non-Model Law enactors.2 s2
English Courts have recently shown an increased willingness
to allow the administration of domestic assets at the domicile of a for-
eign enterprise. In In re HIH, the Australian proceedings would not
replicate the English priorities for English assets.2"3 Lord Hoffman,
writing for a plurality of the High Court, noted that English courts
have the discretion to allow administration of English assets even
when English creditors may be hurt by the application of foreign
law. 2 4 At least one English court has relied upon Lord Hoffman's ar-
gument.2 s 5 Additionally, administrative savings derived from a con-
solidated proceeding may also impact a proceeding's decision to allow
278 Id.
279 Id. at 410-11.
280 Janger, Universal Proceduralism, supra note 15, at 842-43.
281 See supra Part II(c)(v).
282 See McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [5], [7], [10]. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113 (1895).
283 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [2] (noting that reinsurance claims are treated pari
passu in England while they treated less generously in Australia). This is an ex-
ample of a rejection of a synthetic secondary proceeding. See supra notes 51-56 and
accompanying text.
284 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [29], [30].
285 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 2129, [61] (citing In re HiH,
[2008] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 W.L.R. 852 (H.L.), [29] (appeal taken from Eng.) (Hoff-
man, L.)).
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foreign administration of its assets.28 6 In effect, a balance exists be-
tween promoting a domestic policy and "co-operat[ing] with the courts
in the country of the principal liquidation to ensure that all the com-
pany's assets are distributed to its creditors under a single system of
distribution."2 8 7
As Lord Hoffman wrote in In re HIH, "[t]he power to remit as-
sets to the principal liquidation is exercised when the English court
decides that there is a foreign jurisdiction more appropriate than En-
gland for purpose of dealing with all the outstanding questions in the
winding up.'"288 Additionally, one Canadian Justice stated that a con-
solidated MEG proceeding should "... implement a plan so as to reor-
ganize as a global unit, especially where there is an established
interdependence on a transnational basis...,2s What better way to
establish appropriateness and show interdependence than through ec-
onomic integration? With the foreign proceeding's blessing, a United
States bankruptcy court can administer the foreign members of a
MEG under Article 7 of the Model Law or common law principles of
comity.
C. The Potential for Consolidated MEG Proceedings
Although the effects of States' unwillingness to relinquish sov-
ereignty over members of MEGs are well chronicled, the advantages
offered by the United States can overcome this resistance. The United
States has well respected, debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws. The
United States' deep Debtor-in-Possession ("DIP") financing market
could also be instrumental to a MEG's reorganization.
Avianca illustrates the potential success of consolidated MEG
proceedings in the United States. Avianca was the leading Columbian
airline, but it filed for chapter 11 protection in the United States to
avail itself of United States bankruptcy law.2 9 ° Avianca could not ob-
tain jurisdiction over many of its creditors in Columbia but it could in
the United States. 291' Additionally, in 2003, the Columbian bank-
ruptcy law was "only four years old and relatively untested, particu-
286 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [11] (noting that the Court of Appeal considered the
benefits of a foreign administration as a possible reason for allowing foreign ad-
ministration of domestic assets to the detriment of domestic creditors).
287 Id. at [301.
288 Id. at [28] (emphasis added).
289 In re Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd., Re, [20001 5 B.L.R. (3d) 75, 18 C.B.R.
(4th) 157 (Can. Ont. SCJ-CL) (emphasis added); James M. Farley, Globalization
and Its Impact on Cooperation and Coordination in Cross-Border Insolvency
Cases, Am. Bar Ass'n Conference (Sept. 24, 2008), at 32 (emphasis added).
290 Avianca, 303 B.R. at 3.
291 Id. at 10.
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larly in large cases. ' '292 Moreover, it did not have a provision for
rejecting a lease.2 9 3 Without the rejection of certain engine leases,
Avianca's reorganization would have been futile. 294  Section 365
proved invaluable to the debtors' reorganizations.2 9 5 Although one
United States based creditor filed a motion to dismiss, most parties in
interest either supported the filing or failed to file similar dismissal
motions.2 9 6 Because "Avianca's principal creditors were located in the
United States and the Columbian parties in interest were willing to
participate in the United States, the court found that Avianca should
be allowed to file in the United States.2 9 7
Both creditors and debtors benefit from the United States'
debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws and rich body of case law. The United
States' bankruptcy laws are more debtor-friendly than most States' re-
gimes.29' As illustrated by Avianca, the provisions of the Code can be
more helpful than local bankruptcy law and can increase the prospects
for maximum creditor recovery and continued existence of the debtor
as a going concern.29 9 More recently, European shipping magnates




295 See In re Avianca, 323 B.R. at 879.
296 Avianca, 303 B.R. at 7-8.
297 Id. at 13.
298 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable
to Debtors? Evidence From Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1532 (1997). Although
critics may argue that the case would have eventuated differently after the enact-
ment of Chapter 15, the facts of the case make this hypothesis unlikely. After the
enactment of Chapter 15, a dissenting creditor could have commenced a proceed-
ing in Columbia and then called upon the Columbian proceeding to stake its claim
as the Main Proceeding for Avianca, S.A. However, no proceeding was pending at
the time the Chapter 11 was filed. Avianca, 303 B.R. at 12. Even under the now-
repealed version § 305(a)(2), one of the key considerations for dismissal was the
existence of a foreign proceeding. See, e.g., id. at 11 (citing In re Cenargo Int'l,
PLC., 294 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re lonica, 241 B.R. 829 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Xacur, 219 B.R. 956 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1998)). The creditors
surely knew the importance of a parallel proceeding and they failed to commence a
proceeding in the weeks following the petition date. See Avianca, 303 B.R. at 3, 7
(showing that the petition date was March 28, 2003, and the emergency motion to
dismiss was filed on April 11, 2003).
299 Even compared to Canada, a nation whose bankruptcy laws are very similar to
the United States, the cramdown and automatic stay provisions of the Code are
more generous for debtors. Jarred Leibner, Note, An Executory Approach to Cross-
Border Insolvencies, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2010).
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fleets throughout the reorganization process. 30 0 Therefore, the United
States' bankruptcy laws may mitigate concerns about hegemony and
Pride. A foreign proceeding should be willing to allow administration
of a local affiliate abroad if it increases the potential for a solution that
allows the affiliate to continue operating as a going concern. Just as
Delaware benefits from the depth of its corporate law compared to
other states,30 1 the depth of United States bankruptcy law allows for
greater predictability.30 2 If the major creditors recognize the value of
a potential group-wide solution in the United States through the appli-
cation of United States bankruptcy law,30 3 foreign proceedings will be-
come more helpful.30 4
Increased prospects for DIP financing could dampen the impact
of increased uncertainty surrounding a member's COMI. DIP financ-
ing is often necessary for insolvent entities to fulfill their cash flow
needs during a reorganization3 0 5 or in the time prior to an asset
sale.30 6 Both the Working Group and commentators have discussed
provisions for cross-border DIP financing and have emphasized the
significant obstacles. 30 7 These include the priority of DIP finance in
other jurisdictions and a solvent group member's ability to finance an-
other group member. Many of these highlighted issues occur only be-
300 Michelle W. Bockmann, European Shipowners to Seek U.S. Court Protection,
Law Firm Says, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
2012-01-26/european-shipowners-to-seek-u-s-court-protection-law-firm-says.html.
301 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525, 526 (2001) (asserting that Delaware's large amount of judicial precedents al-
legedly leads to greater predictability). But see William J. Carney & George B.
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware's Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
55-64 (2009).
302 See Avianca, 303 B.R. at 10.
303 See id. at 13; In re Cenargo Int'l, PLC., 294 B.R. 571, 592-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003) (overruling the objection to dismissal of the unsecured creditors committee
for a British shipping company as it was the only party who wanted to pursue a
bankruptcy case in the United States).
304 Canadian Justice Farley suggested that consolidated proceedings for a MEG
would be proper when one jurisdiction can independently administer the case ef-
fectively. Farley, supra note 289, at 32. He demonstrated his willingness to accom-
modate a group-based solution in In re Babcock & Wilcox Canada, Ltd., where he
allowed a solvent Canadian to seek relief in the United States even though solvent
entities are ineligible to file for protection in Canada. 18 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (2000).
305 DIP financing has positive impact on recovery rates for creditors. Maria
Carapeto, Does Debtor-in-Possession Financing Add Value?, (Cass Bus. Sch. Re-
search Paper, Paper No. 294-1999) (May 27, 1999), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 161428.
306 Sarra, supra note 235, at 572-73.
307 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2008, supra note 127, at 5-7; Sarra,
supra note 235, at 576.
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cause parallel proceedings are currently necessary. ° s If proceedings
are consolidated in the COMI of the Group, its substantive bankruptcy
law would apply to the priority of DIP financing.3 °9 The debtor's origi-
nal lenders usually become its DIP lenders.3 1 ° Therefore, some of the
largest and most important creditors will benefit from attractive DIP
financing law. When lenders benefit from attractive DIP financing
law, it counterbalances the greater uncertainty surrounding the
COMIs of the Group and individual members. Consolidation of MEGs
in the United States would increase the potential for DIP financing in
many cases due to the generous priority provisions of the Code for such
financing.311 Lender protection techniques such as roll-ups and the
more controversial cross-collateralizations would also help.3" 2 The po-
tential for greater returns on a procedurally consolidated MEG in the
United States case may offset the increased uncertainty surrounding
the COMI of the MEG's members.
VI. ECONOMIC INTEREST TEST
Although scholars have mentioned "economic integration" as
the touchstone for consolidating MEG proceedings,3 1 3 few have tried to
define the analysis, and for now, no one has suggested how it would
apply in the United States. Analyzing the definition is important not
only for a future amendment but also for the current U.S. bankruptcy
regime. If economic integration is added as an amendment to the
Model Law, it will probably be undefined like COMI.3 14 United States
308 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2008, supra note 127, at 5, 6.
309 See Sarra, supra note 235, at 568.
310 Id. at 574 (noting that pre-petition lenders are incentivized to provide post-
petition financing to preserve their spot in the hierarchy of priorities).
311 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)-(e) (2006); see also Sarra, supra note 235, at 573 (cita-
tions omitted) (explaining that Canadian bankruptcy laws do not expressly allow
priority DIP financing and that it is an "extraordinary remedy"); David A. Skeel,
Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1905, 1933-34 (2004) (noting the sparse use of Hungary's DIP financing
provision because unlike the Code's, it did not provide for special priority for the
DIP lender).
312 Scott D. Cousins, Postpetition Financing of Dot-Corns, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 759,
798-801 (2002) (discussing roll-up and cross-collateralizations generally).
313 See, e.g., Adams & Fincke, supra note 3, at 84; Bufford, Global Venue, supra
note 3, at 136.
314 LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 30, at 143 (describing COMI as"vague and practically meaningless"). The Model Laws seeks to minimize conflict
by not creating substantive rules. Universal Proceduralists believe this is the best
for international law as harmonized substantive law will decrease constructive
competition across regimes. See Janger, Universal Proceduralism, supra note 15,
at 821-22.
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bankruptcy courts will be forced to analyze the term and create an
analytical framework. In the case of COMI, bankruptcy courts use rel-
evant U.S. precedent as well as EC precedent and EC law to help guide
their analysis.3 1 Unless another State adopts a framework for eco-
nomic integration first, United States bankruptcy courts would not
have direct precedent to help analyze economic integration. Therefore,
bankruptcy courts will consider sources such as the Proposed Legisla-
tive Guide, analogous precedent, and academic commentary. As pro-
filed in Part V, a consolidated MEG proceeding could currently occur
in the United States and the Economic Integration Test could form
part of a § 1112(b) analysis of the foreign members.
Deciding whether a MEG is economically integrated is impor-
tant both to mitigate concerns about consolidation injuring Pride and
to increase acceptance of group-based MEG solutions. Without suffi-
cient tethers binding the various members to the parent, each member
is an independent entity with its own COMI. Even procedural consoli-
dation unnecessarily infringes on Pride.3 16 Moreover, if the members
of the MEG are not integrated, a group solution will maximize neither
creditor returns nor the chances of a successful reorganization. 3 1 7 As
noted previously, courts attempting to seize jurisdiction of all MEG
members should use a test of economic integration to ensure consolida-
tion is in the members' best interests and thereby further the accepta-
bility of a consolidated proceeding.
The Economic Integration Test relies upon a test formulated by
the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of New York in the case
of In re General Growth Properties ("GGP").31 s The first two parts of
the Test use analyses from GGP.3 1 ' The Interests of the Group Analy-
sis decides whether the interests of the group and the individual mem-
bers would be best served by allowing the individual members to file.
The Good Faith Analysis judges the objective futility of the member's
filing and whether the member has a subjective bankruptcy pur-
pose.320 Although these two analyses are applied slightly differently
315 See In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105770, at *10, *20-21
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011) (analyzing the principal place of business as part of
COMI analysis); In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458
B.R. 63, 74 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing, inter alia, Collins & Aikman Corp.
Group, [2005] EWCH (Ch) 1754 P 39, 2005 WL 4829623; Shierson v. Vlieland-
Boddy, [2005] WECA Civ. 974 [2005] W.L.R. 3966 (2005)); In re Sphinx Ltd., 351
B.R. 103, 118-19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
316 Mevorach, Towards a Consensus, supra note 7, at 399.
317 Id.
318 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 43.
319 Id. at 61.
320 The Test is stricter than that applied in GGP which required dismissal only
upon a satisfaction of both prongs of the Good Faith Analysis. In re Gen. Growth
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in a MEG case, they remain vital considerations. Comity and assis-
tance are necessary for the COMI of the Group to administer assets of
foreign members. Foreign proceedings will be unwilling to aid a con-
solidated proceeding in the United States if the States where impor-
tant members possess assets will not cooperate, thereby making a
group-based solution futile. Furthermore, allowing abusive filings by
foreign members will undercut support for future proceedings. 3 2 1 An-
alyzing the benefits of a potential consolidated proceeding is important
to garner support from foreign proceedings that control the MEG's as-
sets. The Cumulative Analysis then decides whether the members
who passed the Interests of the Group and the Good Faith Analysis,
plus domestic members, are potentially sufficient to create a group-
based solution. If members fail the Interests of the Group or the Good
Faith analysis, they will not be considered in analyzing whether a con-
solidated solution should be pursued.3 2 2
GGP was not a chapter 15 case, but much of the court's analy-
sis is applicable to MEGs.3 23 The court considered whether solvent
subsidiaries should be allowed to file with their parent in a procedur-
ally consolidated case. Whether to allow a subsidiary to file in a con-
solidated case in the COMI of the Group is a synonymous inquiry. In
both cases a consolidated proceeding should only occur when the mem-
bers are economically integrated-a group solution will benefit the in-
dividual members as well as the group as a whole-and their filings
will be in good faith.
A. Interests of the Group
GGP considered why both the member and group interests
would be best served by allowing the members to file for bankruptcy
protection. 32 4 When the solvent subsidiaries were dragged into bank-
ruptcy to aid a group-wide solution, their creditors objected that they
should not have filed bankruptcy.3 25 In denying the creditors' motion
to dismiss, the court focused on the links between the parent and the
subsidiaries.3 26 First, it noted that the creditors "were unaware that
they were extending credit to a company that was part of a much
larger group, and that there were benefits as well as possible detri-
Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 65-66; see also In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R.
713, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).
321 Leibner, supra note 299, at 1187 (listing a parade of horribles resulting from
allowing abusive filings).
322 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 59.
323 Id. at 54.
324 See id.
325 Id. at 55.
326 See id. at 48-53.
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ments from this structure."3 2 7 Due to the integration of the group, "[ilf
the ability of the Group to obtain refinancing became impaired, the
financial situation of the [solvent] subsidiary[ies] would inevitably be
impaired."32 s Although the interests of the parent should be consid-
ered, GGP cautioned that neither "the interests of the subsidiaries or
their creditors should be sacrificed to the interests of the parents and
their creditors."329 Instead, "there need be no sacrifice of fundamental
rights," when, as in GGP, the interests of the individual subsidiaries
and the group as whole all support the bankruptcy filings of the
subsidiaries.330
GGP relied upon two other cases identifying how links between
a subsidiary and its parent may support a subsidiary's bankruptcy fil-
ing.331 In Heisely v. U.I.P. Engineered Products Corp., the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals allowed the parent's subsidiaries to file for
bankruptcy hours before a state court judgment ordered the sale of the
subsidiaries. 332 The Fourth Circuit found that it was "sound business
practice for [the parent] to seek chapter 11 protection for its wholly
owned subsidiaries when those subsidiaries were crucial to its own re-
organization plan."333 Additionally, "an identity of interest ... justi-
fies the protection of the subsidiaries as well as the parent
corporation."334 In In re Mirant Corp., the bankruptcy court allowed
the filing of an insolvent parent's solvent subsidiary as well.335 Be-
cause the solvent subsidiary was a vital piece to the parent corpora-
tion's enterprise, "[a] failure to file for [relief for] an entity that is a
principal member of the family could prove disastrous...336 Moreo-
ver, the solvent subsidiary would have been injured by the filings of its
affiliates.33 7
Although the Interests of the Group analysis is very fact spe-
cific, it should consider the extent to which a MEG's members' fates
are intertwined, as well as the MEG's corporate governance structure.
If the fates of the MEG's members are strongly intertwined, creditors
327 Id. at 61.
328 Id.
329 Id. at 63.
330 Id.
331 See id.
332 In re U.I.P. Engineered Prods. Corp., 831 F.2d 54, 55-56 (4th Cir. 1987).
333 Id. at 56.
334 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 61-62 (quoting In re U.I.P. Engi-
neered Prods. Corp., 831 F.2d at 56).
335 In re Mirant Corp., No. 03-46590, 2005 WL 2148362, at *13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Jan. 26, 2005).
336 Id. at *6.
337 Id.
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should expect MEG consolidation. 3 Creditors of group members lo-
cated outside of the COMI of the Group will surely complain about the
consolidation of the proceedings, but just as in GGP, the integration of
the MEG members will provide notice that the group members' futures
are interdependent.3 3 9 Paralleling the analysis used in Heisely, an In-
terest of the Group analysis should consider the effects of a member
being organized alone at its COMI compared to its potential place in a
group-based proceeding administered by the COMI of the Group.340 If
a member were a vital cog in the MEG, but standing alone, it would be
far less valuable or unable to operate. Then, similarly to Heisley, the
interests of the group and member would both favor a group-based so-
lution. Such a comparison would be vital for winning support and
comity from other proceedings. The factors enumerated by the Work-
ing Group could also illustrate the interrelatedness of group members.
The degree of control the parent exerts over the subsidiary, including
its corporate governance, administrative functions, and corporate pol-
icy, as well as the size of the parent's ownership stake in subsidiary,
could all be useful for analyzing whether a MEG is economically
integrated.3 4 1
B. Good Faith Analysis
The first prong of the Good Faith Analysis is objective futil-
ity.3 4 2 Carolin Corp. v. Miller,3 4 3 the case GGP relied upon, explained
that a debtor fails this prong when "there is no going concern to pre-
serve. . .and. . .no hope of rehabilitation, except according to the
debtor's 'terminal euphoria."'3 4" The court advocated a low threshold
because even a remote chance of a successful reorganization or sale
should be fostered.3 45 One example of an objectively futile debtor oc-
curred where a holding company for corporate debt experienced con-
tinuing losses without attempting to reorganize, rehabilitate, or
liquidate.3 4 6
338 See generally In re Gen. Growth Prods., Inc., 409 B.R. at 43.339 See generally id.
340 See generally In re U.I.P. Engineered Prods. Corp., 831 F.2d at 54.
341 See Treatment of Corporate Groups in Insolvency 2006, supra note 168, at 14.
342 In re Gen. Growth Prods., Inc., 409 B.R. at 65-66.
343 Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693 (4th Cir. 1989).
344 Id. at 701-02.
345 Id. at 701.
346 In re Landmark Atlantic Hess Farm, LLC, 448 B.R. 707, 718 (Bankr. D. Md.
2011) (dismissing case based on another Code section but finding that the circum-
stances "may be found to satisfy a separate cause for dismissal."). Cf Russel v.
HSBC Bank USA N.A. (In re Awal Bank, BSC), Nos. 09-15923(ALG), 10-
15518(ALG), 2011 WL 3416733, at *8 (Aug. 4, 2011) (applying same standard but
failing to dismiss foreign debtor).
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International cases raise issues which may make objective fu-
tility a much more taxing requirement. International comity is neces-
sary for a successful MEG consolidation. Lord Hoffman's beliefs
notwithstanding, to allow a COMI of the Group to administer its as-
sets, a foreign proceeding may require both administrative savings or
benefits and little, if any, harm to local creditors.347 Without the aid of
a foreign proceeding, a member's case may be futile.34
The second prong of the Good Faith Analysis is subjective bad
faith. To possess subjective bad faith, a debtor, inter alia, may lack a
proper purpose for commencing a case. A proper purpose for com-
mencing a chapter 11 case is preserving going concerns and maximiz-
ing property available to satisfy creditors.349 A chapter 7 case only
focuses on the later. In re Mirant is an example of a proper purpose as
the subsidiary's filing was "to continue as a going concern as part of
the corporate family enterprise."350 The debtor's bankruptcy filing in
SGL Carbon is an example of bad faith.351 There, the solvent debtors
tried to use bankruptcy as a shield against impending antitrust litiga-
tion.3" 2 Unlike mass-tort claims defendants who use bankruptcy as a
347 Compare McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [12] (noting the lack of administrative
savings by Australia administering the English assets, yet still allowing their ad-
ministration), with id. at [111 (noting that the Court of Appeal considered the ben-
efits of a foreign administration as a possible reason for allowing foreign
administration of domestic assets to the detriment of domestic creditors). This
holdout power is very concerning but currently insurmountable. See Pottow, A
New Role, supra note 59, at 586 (noting holdout power of local creditors to force
synthetic secondary proceedings).
348 McGrath, [2008] UKHL at [121.
349 In re Integrated Telecom Express, 384 F.3d 108, 119 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434,
453 (1999)). The Third Circuit further explained that a liquidating sale must also
have a proper purpose of "either perserv[ing] some going concern value e.g., by
liquidating a company as a whole or in such a way as to preserve some of the
company's good will, or by maximizing the value of the debtor's estate." Id. at 120
n.4.
350 In re Mirant Corp, No. 03-46590, 2005 WL 2148362, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
Jan. 26, 2005). If the case is under Chapter 11 because no foreign proceeding has
yet commenced, the bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 11 for cause under
§ 1112(b)(4) which provides a non-exhaustive list of factors including the futility of
a plan under § 1112(b)(4)(J), or rely upon § 305(a)(1) which allows dismissal if it
would be in the best interests of creditors and the debtor. If the case is under
Chapter 15 because a foreign proceeding has commenced, then the court may dis-
miss the case relying on § 305(a)(2)(A) and (B) if the purposes of Chapter 15 would
be better served by dismissal. See Mayr, supra note 260, at 481-93.
351 In re SLG Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1999).
352 Id. at 158 ("SGL AG Chairman Robert Koehler conducted a telephone confer-
ence call with securities analysts, stating ... that SGL Carbon's Chapter 11 peti-
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shield against massive adverse judgments, 3 53 SGL Carbon only faced
claims that would not significantly affect its financial stability.314 The
debtor's plan of confirmation proposed to pay all claims in full, in cash,
except antitrust claimants who would receive only "limited-time cred-
its to purchase SGL Carbon's products."3 5 The court found that the
debtor's treatment of the claimants was an attempt to pressure the
plaintiffs into accepting the debtor's settlement proposal of the anti-
trust litigation.3 56 In other words, the court found that debtor's bank-
ruptcy petition "lack[ed] a valid reorganizational purpose and
consequently lack[ed] good faith making it subject to dismissal for'cause.' ' 35 7 Notwithstanding the holding in SGL Carbon, subjective
bad faith is also a low bar.35 8
The incentive to escape foreign courts for invidious reasons,
however, may make the Good Faith requirement more important in
international cases.3 59 This article already chronicled the saga of
Yukos Oil and its attempt to evade its tax debts in Russia. Yukos Oil,
however, is not the only example of a foreign debtor lacking a good
faith, as foreign entities have attempted to succeed where SGL Carbon
failed and obtain a litigation advantage by filing in the United States.
For example, in In re Head, a Canadian debtor filed a chapter 11 peti-
tion in the United States to evade contractual insurance liability and
forum selection obligations pursuant to contracts with Lloyds of
London.360 The bankruptcy court dismissed the filing because it
lacked fundamental fairness and honest intentions. 361 Relying on In
re Head, other bankruptcy courts have also dismissed bankruptcy pro-
ceedings filed by foreign debtors attempting to gain a "perceived legal
advantage."36 2
tion was 'fairly innovative [and] creative' because 'usually Chapter 11 is used as
protection against serious insolvency or credit problems, which is not the case
[with SGL Carbon's petition]."').
353 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville, Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
354 In re SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 167-68.
355 Id. at 167.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 169.
358 See In re SGL Carbon Corp., 233 B.R. 285 (D. Del. 1999), rev'd, 200 F.3d 154,
169 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding by the district court that the debtor's bankruptcy filing
in good faith even considering the facts listed above).
359 See Leibner, supra note 299, at 1186-87 (expressing concern about forum shop-
ping by foreign debtors to use the United States' debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws).
360 In re Head, 223 B.R. 648, 649 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998).
361 See id. at 653-54.
362 See Mayr, supra note 260, at 491 n.79 (listing cases).
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C. Cumulative Analysis
Consolidating cross-border bankruptcies effectuates more
group-wide solutions. If, however, those solutions are impossible, then
consolidation should not be attempted. If a member failed either the
Interests of the Group or the Good Faith Analyses, then a court would
dismiss the member's case.363 After subjecting all foreign members to
both Analyses, those members who passed both may take part of a
group solution.364 The court must then decide whether the domestic
members and the remaining foreign members could comprise a group-
wide solution. If a vital member's case was dismissed, then any type of
group-wide solution might be impossible.
D. Applying Economic Integration Through the Lens of Yukos
Although the Yukos Oil cases were MEG cases, not chapter 15
cases,3 6 5 with some slight factual changes, the cases provide a realistic
trial of the Test. Assume that Yukos was a chapter 11 case, and that
Yukos was a United States MEG (the hypothetical "Yukos USA
MEG"), controlled by a registered office in the United States. Thus,
while the United States would be the COMI of the Group, almost all of
Yukos' assets and subsidiaries are in Russia (including the hypotheti-
cal "Yukos Russia"). By opening bank accounts in the United States,
the subsidiaries could easily satisfy the requirements of § 109 and file
petitions with Yukos USA in the United States. Then, each foreign
member of Yukos USA MEG would be subjected to the Interests of the
Group Analysis and the Good Faith Analysis. Many of the members of
Yukos USA MEG would probably fail the Test, including Yukos Rus-
sia. The Interests of the Group analysis is fact specific but some links
which could be sufficient for Yukos Russia include, (i) Yukos USA's
substantial ownership of Yukos Russia, (ii) control over Yukos Russia's
corporate governance, or (iii) a finding that it had better prospects of
continuing as a going concern by reorganizing with other group
members. 366
363 This is what the movants endeavored to do. See In re Gen. Growth Prods., Inc.,
409 B.R. at 45.
364 The Cumulative Analysis deals with an issue suggested by Eva M.F. de Vette,
who wondered whether an individual debtor's fortunes should be sacrificed for
those of the group. de Vette, supra note 186, at 228.
365 Yukos would have qualified as a Chapter 15 case if it had occurred after the
effective date of Chapter 15, October 17, 2005, and a foreign representative had
applied for recognition. See Bufford, Tertiary, supra note 64, at 171-72.
366 These factors reflect not only those noted by GGP but also the original factors
suggested by the Working Group but eventually, these factors became confused
with the factors for deciding the COMI of the group. See Legislative Guide on In-
solvency Law 2009, supra note 216, at 8-9 (comparing Legislative Guide on In-
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Even if Yukos Russia satisfied the Interests of the Group Anal-
ysis, it would need to satisfy the Good Faith Analysis. First, to show
that its case is not objectively futile, the cooperation of the Russian
government would be a prerequisite to any reorganization or sale. The
second prong, a subjective bankruptcy purpose, will usually follow the
first because countries will not cooperate unless the end result will be
reorganization or sale as compared to an end run on domestic policies
such as taxes. Nonetheless, it is important to curb abusive filings.3 6 7
If the Yukos Russia failed either the Interests of the Group or the Good
Faith Analyses, the bankruptcy court would dismiss its case. Finally,
the court would consider whether the subsidiaries that passed the In-
terests of the Group Analysis and the Good Faith Analysis could, to-
gether with the Yukos USA MEG and any other domestic members,
effectuate a group-wide solution. If many of the subsidiaries' cases
that controlled principal assets were dismissed, a group-wide solution
could be impossible.
CONCLUSION
Globalization requires a more efficient framework for adminis-
tering insolvent MEGs because duplicative proceedings and lost value
currently plague MEG bankruptcies. The current lack of a framework
for consolidating MEG proceedings results directly from the many is-
sues that MEGs pose."' s The better a framework can mitigate issues,
however, the more willing other States will be to allow member consol-
idation. Although the Test is designed to combat these issues, little
other United States-specific commentary exists for comparison. Schol-
arship has directly impacted the Model Law and chapter 15,369 and
solvency Law 2008, supra note 127, at T 13, with Treatment of Corporate Groups
in Insolvency 2006, supra note 168, at [ 35-38).
367 See Erin K. Healy, All's Fair in Love and Bankruptcy? Analysis of the Property
Requirement for Section 109 Eligibility and Its Effect on Foreign Debtors Filing in
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 535, 560 (2004); cf. In re
Compania de Alimentos Fargo, S.A., 376 B.R. 427, 433-35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(noting that a bankruptcy court may dismiss a concurrently pending chapter 11
case if the interests of the chapter 15 are served).
368 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2010, supra note 97, at 3 ("When the text
of what became the UNCITRAL Model Law was debated, groups were regarded as'a stage too far.'").
369 Judges often cite law review articles about chapter 15 for support because of
the immense changes it has wrought and the resulting lack of applicable case law.
See, e.g., Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note 47 (cited by 11 courts); Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 1019, 1024 (2007) (cited by 6 courts).
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future scholarship should seize the opportunity to propose, analyze,
and evaluate frameworks for consolidating MEGs under the Model
Law generally and the United States in particular.
